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of the Nonemployee Spouse's
Interest Under ERISA
By DEENE GOODLAW SOLOMON*
Retirement benefits earned by an employee during marriage may
be one of the most substantial assets accumulated by the couple. If a
marriage ends in divorce, those benefits play a significant role in mari-
tal property arrangements made under state law. Traditionally, retire-
ment benefits are treated as income to the employee spouse and
therefore are included in the measure of his or her ability to furnish
continued support to dependents in the form of alimony and child sup-
port.'
A growing number of jurisdictions are recognizing that retirement
benefits are more than a measure of capacity to pay alimony. Increas-
ingly, retirement benefits are being treated as property2 that is an asset
of the marital community and which, like other marital property,
should be divided between the spouses upon dissolution of the mar-
riage. The right of the nonemployee spouse to share in retirement ben-
efits earned during marriage as a co-earner of those benefits, not merely
as a needy dependent, has been most fully recognized in community
* A.B., 1961, M.A., 1962, Stanford University; J.D., 1965, Harvard University.
Member, State Bar of California. In the interest of fair disclosure, the author advises she
wrote the amicus curiae brief filed by Equal Rights Advocates on behalf of the nonemployee
spouse in Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313
(9th Cir. June 21, 1978). She would like to thank Prudence M. Blum for her invaluable
assistance.
I. See, e.g., Inre Marriage of Ellis, 36 Colo. App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347, a 'd, 191 Colo.
317, 552 P.2d 506 (1975); Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976). For
cases upholding the collection of spousal support awards from retirement plans covered by
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976)), see Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d
Cir. 1979); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979). The Tax Divi-
sion of the Justice Department filed amicus curiae briefs for the Secretaries of Labor and the
Treasury in both cases, supporting the position of the nonemployee spouse.
2. See P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND SOCIALISM
CAME To AMERICA 149 (1976).
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property jurisdictions. 3 Community property law generally treats both
3. The law determining the rights and interests of the nonemployee spouse has been
most fully developed in California. See Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pen-
sions and Social Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
417, 417-29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reppy]. Even in California, the rights of the nonem-
ployee spouse are significantly more limited than those of the employee. There is a line of
cases, particularly those involving public retirement plans (which would not be covered by
ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1976)), which in some circumstances limited a nonem-
ployee spouse's right to collect his or her interest from the plan by providing that such a
right terminates on the death of the employee or the nonemployee, whichever occurs first.
This so-called "terminable interest rule" has been upheld in Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461,
473, 492 P.2d 13, 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333 (1972), disapproved on other grounds in In re
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641
(1976), and Benson v. Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 360-62, 384 P.2d 649, 652-53, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 257, 260-61 (1963). This rule apparently does not preclude a court from considering
the relative life expectancies of the spouses and the actuarial value of their respective pen-
sion benefits under the plan when dividing the total'community property. See Waite v.
Waite, 6 Cal. 3d at 473 n.8, 474 n.9, 492 P.2d at 21, 22, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 333, 334; Benson v.
Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d at 361-62, 384 P.2d at 652-53, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 260-61. The rule has
been seriously criticized by commentators, see, e.g., Reppy, supra, at 462-82, and by the
courts, see e.g., In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 654-56, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184,
192-94 (1974), disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851
n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976). The terminable interest rule does not
apply to contributions made by an employee during marriage. They are included in the
community property and divided between the spouses without regard to their life expectan-
cies. Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 41 n.8, 473 P.2d 765, 770, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 61, 66 (1970), disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838,
851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976). One court has applied the rule to
a private pension plan, seeIn re Marriage of Bruegl, 47 Cal. App. 3d 201, 120 Cal. Rptr. 597
(1975), disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14,
544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976). The relationship of the terminable interest
rule to the spouse's interest in ERISA is discussed further at notes 151-96 & accompanying
text infra.
The nonemployee spouse's interest in the benefits is further limited by the employee's
freedom to change employment, which may result in forfeiture of nonvested benefits, includ-
ing the nonenployee spouse's interest therein. Apart from constitutional problems, one
could hardly expect a court to require an employee to continue in service until benefits vest.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, in California the employee also retains the exclusive right
to modify terms of employment or elect between alternative retirement programs. In re
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 849, 544 P.2d 561, 568, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1976).
The employee thus retains the sole right to define the nature of the retirement benefits
owned by the community. Id at 850, 544 P.2d at 568, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 640. Earlier cases
permitted a court to order an employee to make an election that fully preserved the nonem-
ployee spouse's interest, if no election had been made at the time of dissolution. Phillipson
v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 48, 473 P.2d 765, 775, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 71 (1970),
disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n. 14, 544 P.2d
561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976); Ball v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 30 Cal. App. 3d
624, 630, 106 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665 (1973) (dictum). The Supreme Court in In re Marriage of
Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), however, restricted Phillip-
son to its facts, which were unique in that the employee spouse had absconded with most of
the community assets. The trial court, to equalize the division of community property,
awarded the nonemployee spouse the entire retirement benefit. Id at 849 n. 12, 544 P.2d at
[Vol. 31
spouses as co-owners of the benefits, with equal rights to enjoy them as
of the time they are earned.4 Community property jurisdictions also
generally include these benefits in the community property to be di-
vided on divorce. An increasing number of noncommunity states also
seek to divide the marital property equitably between spouses on di-
vorce,5 particularly states that have adopted the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, which authorizes such a division.6 In those jurisdictions,
when retirement benefits are divided in the divorce, the nonemployee
spouse becomes a co-owner of the benefits at the time of divorce. Each
spouse's interest is then defined and discreet, not subject to modifica-
tion as a result of changed financial circumstances, remarriage, or, pos-
568, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 640. If the plan has not been joined under CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4363.1
to 4364 (West Supp. 1980), it need only deal with the employee without consultation or
approval of the nonemployee spouse. See Ball v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 30 Cal. App.
3d 624, 629, 106 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665 (1973). Retirement benefits thus seem to fall under the
"business interest" exception to the joint management and control usually exercised by both
parties in California over community property. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp.
1980). For a brief discussion of disability benefits paid after separation see note 50 infra.
4. See, e.g., Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); In re Marriage
of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976); Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d
161 (La. 1977); T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); Ellett v. Ellett,
573 P.2d 1179 (Nev. 1978); Le Clert v. Le Clert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969); Cearley v.
Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976). See also Fink & Victor, Slicing the Pension Pie: Tax
Problems Involved in Spousal Division of Unmatured Pension Benets, 49 L.A.B. BULL 186
(1974); Hardie, Pay Now or Later: Alternatives in the Disposition of Retirement Benefts on
Divorce, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 106 (1978); Reppy, supra note 3; Thiede, The Community Property
Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private Employee Retirement Benefts, 9 U.S.F.L.
REV. 635 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Thiede]; Comment, Retirement Benefits and the Right to
Reimbursement, 11 Hous. L. REv. 960 (1974); Note, In Re Marriage ofBrown: Every Family
Lawyer Knows *hat It' Done-Do You Know 9hatIt Can Do?, 4 PEPPERDiNE L. REV. 147
(1976); Comment, Apportionment of Community Property Interests in Prospective Military Re-
tirement Benefts upon Divorce, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 72 (1972); Comment, The W fe's Commu-
nity Interest in Her Husband's Qualoed Pension or Profit Sharing Plan, 50 TEX. L. REv. 334
(1972); Note, Pension Rights and Community Property: From French to Brown, 4 W. ST. U.L.
REv. 91 (1976); 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 135 (1977); 8 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 834 (1977).
5. In re Marriage of Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 544 P.2d 639 (1975); In re Marriage of
Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975), notedin 42 Mo. L. REv. 143 (1977); McGrew
v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 377 A.2d 697 (1977); Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 353
A.2d 144 (1976); Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 134 N.J. Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (1975); Johnson
v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 2d 137, 254 N.W.2d 198 (1977); Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176,
226 N.W.2d 518 (1975). See also Foster & Freed, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension
Benefts, 16 J. FAM. L. 187 (1978); Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43
Mo. L. REv. 157, 171-76 (1978); Note, Pensions As Property Subject To Equitable Division
upon Divorce in Oklahoma, 14 TULSA L.J. 168 (1978). See generally Prager, Sharing Princi-
piles and the Future ofMaritalPropery Law, 25 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1977). But see Fenny v.
Fenny, 259 Ark. 858, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976) (refusing to consider pension as part of marital
property); Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976) (same).
6. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307. The Act has been adopted in
Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, and Illinois.
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sibly,7 the death of either spouse.
In dividing retirement plan benefits upon divorce, many states,
both community and noncommunity, have distinguished between re-
tirement benefits that are vested at the time of divorce and those that
are nonvested. 8 Retirement benefits that accrue during the employee's
years of service as a participant in a retirement plan are vested only
when an employee is entitled to receive those benefits without addi-
tional service as an employee.9 Vested benefits are not necessarily cur-
rently payable. For example, benefits earned by a thirty-five year old
employee with ten years of service may be fully vested, although not
payable before he or she reaches age sixty-five.
Under state law, the preferred method of disposing of retirement
benefits in a dissolution proceeding is to award the benefits entirely to
the employee spouse with property of equivalent value being awarded
to the nonemployee spouse.10 This method fosters a clean break be-
tween the parties, gives the benefits to the spouse from whose employ-
ment they derive, and does not interfere with the administration of the
retirement plan because the administrator will need to deal only with
the employee.
If the retirement benefits comprise a substantial portion of the
marital property, however, it may not be possible to award them en-
tirely to the employee spouse. In that case, they may be divided be-
tween the spouses at the time of divorce, even though not currently
payable from the plan. If the benefits are not susceptible of valuation,
or if they are nonvested, a court may retain jurisdiction until such time
as the benefits are payable and award each spouse a portion of the
benefits as paid, based on the ratio of the length of the marriage to the
7. The question of whether the nonemployee spouse's interest is modifiable by the
death of either spouse is uncertain. See note 3 supra.
8. Compare In re Marriage of Ellis, 36 Colo. App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347, aff'd, 191 Colo.
317, 552 P.2d 506 (1975); Robbins v. Robbins, 463 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1971); and White v.
White, 136 N.J. Super. 552, 347 A.2d 360 (1975) (nonvested benefits were not considered to
be part of marital property) with In re Marriage of Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 544 P.2d 639
(1975), and Penkowski v. Penkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518 (1975) (vested benefits
held to be part of marital property).
9. ERISA establishes minimum vesting standards for determining forfeitability of
pension rights. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976); I.R.C. § 411.
10. See, e.g., Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 46, 473 P.2d 765, 774,
89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 70 (1970), disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.
3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rtpr. 633, 641 (1976). See also Marriage of
Marx, 97 Cal. App. 3d 552, 559-60 (1979) (husband objected for tax reasons to being
awarded entire fund; court nonetheless found a "strong economic situation" warranting
award to wife of home and award to husband of fund).
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length of total employment."
The treatment of retirement plan benefits by state courts cannot be
discussed or analyzed adequately without reference to federal regula-
tory legislation. All privately funded deferred benefit plans engaged in
interstate commerce are subject to Title I of the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 197412 (ERISA). Section 514 of ERISA
supersedes all state laws relating to employee benefit plans. 13 Whether
and to what extent section 514 preempts state marital property laws has
been a troublesome issue which has prompted much litigation 14 and
11. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 639 (1976). This method of determining the marital property interest of a retirement
benefit earned partly during the marriage and partly before and/or after is known as the
"time rule method" and is used unless it does not approximate the respective marital and
nonmarital property interest. It has been most clearly developed in California. In re Mar-
riage of Judd, 68 Cal. App. 3d 515, 522, 137 Cal. Rptr. 318, 321 (1977); In re Marriage of
Adams, 64 Cal. App. 3d 181, 186, 187 n.8, 134 Cal. Rptr. 298, 302 (1976); In re Marriage of
Freiberg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 311, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792, 797 (1976); In re Marriage of Martin,
50 Cal. App. 3d 581, 583, 123 Cal. Rptr. 634, 634 (1975), disapproved on other grounds in In
re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641
(1976). For more detailed discussions of the time rule method. see LeVan, Allocating De-
ferred Compensation in Louisiana, 38 LA. L. REv. 35 (1979); McNamara, Caifornia Commu-
nity Property Aspects of Executive Compensation, U.S. CAL. 1978 TAX INST. 151, 158;
Comment, Appointment of Community Property Interests in Prospective Military Retirement
Benefts upon Divorce, 9 ST. MARY's L. REv. (1977).
12. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1381 (1976).
13. Section 514(a) of ERISA provides: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this
title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976). Under
subsection (b) of § 514, it is stated: "(1) This section shall not apply with respect to any
cause of action which arose, or any act or omission which occurred, before January 1, 1975.
"(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insur-
ance, banking, or securities.
"(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is
not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the
purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment
company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust com-
panies, or investment companies.
"(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit use by the Secretary of serv-
ices or facilities of a State agency as permitted under section 1136 of this title.
"(4) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal
law of a State." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1976).
14. See, e.g., Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Central States Southeast v. Parr, No. 9-70184 (E.D.
ERISA
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commentary. 15
The issue recently was resolved by the United States Supreme
Court in favor of the state laws and against preemption. Carpenter's
Pension Fund v. Campa'6 came before the Court on appeal from a Cali-
fornia state court decision. The case involved three nonemployee
spouses, each of whom had been awarded a community property inter-
est in the retirement benefits of their former husbands. The retirement
fund was joined 17 and ordered by the California court to pay the
spouses a portion of each pension payment payable to their respective
former husbands. 18 The retirement fund appealed to the Supreme
Court on the ground that ERISA precluded a state court from ordering
payments directly from the fund. The Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal for want of a substantial federal question, a decision on the mer-
its' 9 and an action binding on all state and lower federal courts. Its
value as precedent is unclear,20 but the Court's action would appear to
Mich. Dec. 12, 1979); Senco of Fla., Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Francis
v. United Technologies, 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919
(N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978); Carpenter's Pension
Fund v. Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), appeal dismissedfor want of
a substantialfederal question, 100 S.Ct. 696 (1980); In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App.
3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 709 (1980); Johns v. Retirement
Fund Trust, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978), appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, 100 S. Ct. 696 (1980).
15. See Dickinson, Role of Retirement Plan, 10 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 644 (1975);
Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law under the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 23 (1978); Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution
Who Gets the Pension Rights.- Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, 5 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 191 (1978); Reppy, supra note 3 at 483-527; Thiede, supra note 4; Turza & Hal-
loway, Preemption of State Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 163 (1979); Comment, ERISA Preemption and Indirect Regulation
of Employee We/fare Plans Through State Insurance Laws, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1536 (1978);
Note, Attachment of Pension Benefits Under ERISA, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 255 (1979); Com-
ment, Preemption of California Community Property Law by ERISA.: Congressional Intent
and Judicial Interpretation, 10 PAC. L.J. 881 (1979); Comment, ERISA: Does it Prohibit a
State Court from Attaching Plan Benefits?, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 47 (1978); Note, ERISA
Preemption or Divorce Decree Enforcement Against Pension Plans, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 277.
16. 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), appeal dismissedfor want of a sub-
stantialfederal question, 100 S. Ct. 696 (1980).
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4363.1 (West Supp. 1980) permits joinder of pension funds in
marital dissolution proceedings.
18. 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 132, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362, 373 (1979).
19. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975). When the Court concludes that the
state court decision is correct, the appeal will be "dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question." The dismissal is the equivalent of affirmance on the merits. R. STERN & E.
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 5.18, at 377-78 (5th ed. 1978).
20. The decision is binding on lower federal and state courts but is not precedent for
the Supreme Court. See HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 649 (2d ed. 1973).
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render the preemption issue moot as to community property.
The Supreme Court's decision in Campa with respect to commu-
nity property is in accord with the weight of authority permitting col-
lection of alimony and child support directly from a plan.21 It also is in
accord with the administrative position of the Internal Revenue Service
that payment of court ordered support or community property interests
directly from a plan will not result in disqualification of the plan under
Internal Revenue Code section 401(a).22 Finally, the decision comports
with the position expressed by the Department of Justice in its amicus
curiae brief23 filed in two cases addressing the preemption issue dis-
posed of by the Court at the same time as Campa.24 Moreover, Con-
gress presently is considering legislation, in the form of Senate Bill 209,
that would permit plans to pay support or marital property claims di-
rectly to the nonemployee spouse.
25
While the Supreme Court's decision in Campa appears correct, the
mode of decision is disappointing. An issue as complex as ERISA pre-
emption merits full review by the Court, including complete briefs, oral
arguments, and a fully articulated opinion, especially in light of the
Court's decision the prior term that the Railroad Retirement Act
preempts community property statutes.26 There is some speculation
2 7
21. Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry,
592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Senco of Fla., Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
22. E.g., Rev. Rul 80-27, 1980-4 I.R.B. at 8; Private Letter Ruling 7952045. But see
Private Letter Ruling 8010051 (Dec. 12, 1979) (payment to the nonemployee spouse of
vested benefits which are not currently payable will disqualify the plan).
23. 15 DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) G-1 (January 22, 1980).
24. In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 709 (1980); Johns v. Retirement Fund Trust, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 551, appeal dismissedjfor want ofjutrisdilion, 100 S. Ct. 696 (1980).
25. S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 555 (1979), has been passed by the
United States Senate and is awaiting action by the House of Representatives. Section 128 of
S. 209 provides: "Section 206(d) of such Act [ERISA] is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new paragraph:
"(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a judgment, decree or order (including
an approval of a property settlement agreement), pursuant to a State domestic relations law
(whether of the common law or community property type), which-
"(A) affects the marital property rights of any person in any benefit payable under a
pension plan or the legal obligation of any person to provide child support or make alimony
payments, and
"(B) does not require a pension plan to alter the effective date, timing, form, duration,
or amount of any benefit payments under the plan or to honor any election which is not
provided for under the plan or which is made by a person other than a participant or benefi-
ciary."
26. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). The Railroad Retirement Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 231-231(t) (1976), differs from private plans covered by ERISA in several material
aspects. First, it is statutory and may be altered or eliminated by Congress at any time.
ERISA
that the Supreme Court is waiting to hear Stone v. Stone,28 a case now
pending in the Ninth Circuit. Nonetheless, postponement of a defini-
tive decision does a great disservice to the courts, individuals, and plan
administrators who must make decisions in the face of the present un-
certainty. The state court in Campa relied heavily on the district
court's opinion in Stone, whose facts are virtually indistinguishable
from those in Campa.29 The Supreme Court's decision undoubtedly
will deter further litigation of the issue by plan administrators and par-
ticipants. 30 A trustee of an employee benefit plan will be especially
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 575. By contrast, ERISA covers voluntary, consen-
sual arrangements between employees or their bargaining units and employers. Second, the
anti-assignment provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act expressly prohibit anticipation,
garnishment, attachment, taxation or assignment of any annuity, 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976),
except for child or spousal support. See 45 U.S.C. § 231a(c)(3)(i) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 659(a)
(Supp. II 1978). This exception does not include community property or other marital prop-
erty claims. 42 U.S.C. § 662(c) (Supp. II 1978). But see Pub. L. No. 95-366, 92 Stat. 600
(1978) (permitting payment of civil service retirement benefits to a former spouse pursuant
to a state court decree). ERISA, on the other hand, permits voluntary, revocable assign-
ments of up to 10% of an employee's retirement benefits and assignments of the full vested
portion of the benefit to the employer as security for a loan. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1976);
see also I.R.C. § 401(a)(13). ERISA also contemplates collection of state and federal taxes
directly from the plan. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(2)(ii) (1978). Third, the Railroad Re-
tirement Act also specifically provides to a worker's spouse an individual benefit which ter-
minates on divorce, indicating congressional intent not to permit divorced spouses to enjoy
benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 23 1d(c)(3) (1976). ERISA has no comparable provision.
27. DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) G-1 (Jan. 22, 1980).
28. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21,
1978).
29. In Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313
(9th Cir. June 21, 1978), the husband had retired and was receiving a pension when the
couple was divorced. Mrs. Stone was awarded a share of her husband's pension in the disso-
lution proceeding. He apparently fled the jurisdiction. She then sued Mr. Stone and the
plan in state court seeking to collect her share from Mr. Stone or, in the alternative, directly
from the plan. Mr. Stone defaulted but the plan removed the case to federal court. The
court held that ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), does not preempt California
community property laws, that the award of an interest in a pension plan to the nonem-
ployee spouse is not a prohibited assignment under ERISA section 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1) (1976), and that a nonemployee spouse may sue the plan directly to collect a
share of the matured pension. 450 F. Supp. at 920, 923-33. Stone has been followed by
California courts deciding the issue. In re Marriage of Pilatti, 96 Cal. App. 3d 63, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1979); In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979),
appeal dismissedfor want of a substantial federal question, 100 S. Ct. 696 (1980); In re Mar-
riage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978); Johns v. Retirement Fund
Trust, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978).
30. A motion for summary dismissal of the appeal because of Campa was filed in Stone
by attorneys for appellants. Application for Order to Dispense with Oral Argument and
Summarily Affirm the Judgment of the District Court, Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919
(N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978) (on file with The
Hastings Law Journal). The Ninth Circuit denied the motion on March 25, 1980.
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reluctant to litigate the preemption issue in light of the Supreme
Court's action and the government's administrative posture, because to
do so may expose it to liability for wasted trust assets. As Justice Bren-
nan aptly stated in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in Colorado
Springs Amusements, Ltd v. Rizzo:
3'
Resolution of important issues, in my view, ought not to be made
solely on the basis of a single jurisdictional statement, without the
benefit of other court decisions and the helpful commentary that fol-
lows significant developments in the law. . . . [N]o court will again
consider the merits of the question presented to this Court ...
[P]uzzled state and lower court judges are left to guess as to the
meaning and scope of our unexplained dispositions. 3
2
Even if the Campa decision were satisfactory in a jurisprudential
sense, a definitive resolution of the preemption issue alone would not
resolve the problems of accommodation of the interest of the nonem-
ployee spouse. That interest still must be accommodated under ERISA
in a manner that comports with the goals of the statute. Satisfaction of
the nonemployee spouse's interest accordingly should be at small addi-
tional cost to the retirement plan and its administrator, should preserve
the financial integrity of the plan, and should protect the interests of all
participants in the plan as well as those of the individual spouses.
These goals can best be achieved if the trustee or plan administrator is
given flexibility in making independent distributions to both the non-
employee spouse and the employee spouse, within the basic structure of
ERISA-regulated plans. This Article describes the structure and oper-
ation of employee benefit plans under ERISA and sets out legislative
proposals designed to accommodate the nonemployee spouse's marital
property interest. Because most ERISA covered plans are also tax
qualified under Internal Revenue Code sections 401 to 415,3 3 the tax
aspects of disposition of retirement benefits on divorce, together with
proposed changes in the current law, are discussed.
Description of Employee Benefit Plans Covered by ERISA
ERISA was enacted to protect the interests of participants and
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.34 It establishes dual jurisdic-
31. 428 U.S. 913 (1976).
32. Id at 917-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. I.R.C. §§ 401-415. See note 51 & accompanying text infra.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). Title II of ERISA is now incorporated into the Internal
Revenue Code, primarily in I.R.C. §§ 401-415. In this Article, "Act" references are to sec-
tions of Titles I, III and IV of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144, 1201-1242, 1301-1381 (1976);
references to those provisions that are part of the Internal Revenue Code are so identified.
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tion in the Departments of Labor and Treasury over all funded em-
ployee benefit and welfare plans, 35 except governmental and church
plans,36 established by any employer or employee organization en-
gaged in commerce.
37
ERISA consists of four titles. Title 138 is concerned primarily with
plan administration. It defines who is a fiduciary, 39 imposes standards
of fiduciary conduct,40 requires reporting of the plan's financial status
to the Labor Department,4 1 and requires disclosure to the participants
35. Title III of ERISA sets out the jurisdiction, administration, and enforcement re-
sponsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1204 (1976). Dual jurisdiction over ERISA has presented serious administrative
difficulties. The responsibilities of the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of La-
bor were realigned effective January 1, 1979, under Reorganization Plan No. 4. Announce-
ment 79-6, 1979-4 I.R.B. at 43. Section 401 of Senate Bill 209 would establish a single
agency, the Employee Benefits Commission, to administer ERISA. Senate Bill 209 is dis-
cussed briefly at note 25 supra.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1976). A governmental plan is a plan established or main-
tained for its employees by the United States government, by the government of any state or
political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.
Governmental plans also include plans covered by the Railroad Retirement Act and plans
of international organizations. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1976). For a description of the opera-
tion of the Railroad Retirement Act, see Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 573-77
(1979).
A church plan is one established and maintained for its employees by a church or con-
vention of churches which is exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 501, but not for employ-
ees of an unrelated business under I.R.C. § 513. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33) (1976). A "church
plan" may elect to be covered by some of the provisions of ERISA under I.R.C. § 4 10(d). 29
U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1976). The statute also includes employers or employee
organizations in any industry affecting commerce. The determination of whether an em-
ployer is engaged in interstate commerce seems to be a factual one which has at times been
interpreted expansively. Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1969); Clyde
v. Broderick, 144 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1944). However, there are some limits. Employees
building a dam for water for an industrial city were held not to be engaged in activities
directly and vitally related to the movement of goods or persons in interstate commerce.
Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960). See also Mitchell v. Krout, 150 F. Supp.
857 (N.D. Cal. 1957). In general, a doctor or lawyer engaged in a practice with local intra-
state patients or clients probably is not engaged in interstate commerce. But see Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1976).
39. The definition of a fiduciary is not a model of clarity. It is defined in the Act as one
who exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of plan assets,
renders investment advice for compensation, or has the authority or responsibility in the
administration of a plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(21)(A) (1976). The "named fiduciary" may be
named in the plan or selected according to a procedure set out in the plan. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1 102(a)(2) (1976). However, fiduciaries need not be named fiduciaries and the term casts a
broad net. See Definitions and Coverage under the Employment Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974, Definition of "Fiduciary," 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (1979).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1113 (1976).
41. Id. § 1023 (annual report of financial and actuarial soundness of the plan).
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and beneficiaries of their rights and benefits under the plan.42 Title I
also sets forth the right of a participant or beneficiary to bring suit in
either federal or state court to clarify or enforce his or her rights to
benefits under the plan.43 Title II,44 which together with Title I com-
prises the core of ERISA's regulatory scheme, governs taxation of the
employer, the employee, and the trust or other funding medium of the
plan. Title II145 provides for administration and enforcement of
ERISA and establishes a congressional joint task force to study ongo-
ing problems of ERISA, including preemption.46 Finally, Title IV47
establishes the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Although a detailed analysis of the requirements for establishing a
plan under ERISA is beyond the scope of this Article, a description of
the basic principles governing such plans is essential to understanding
the problems arising from nonemployee spousal rights in such plans.
All plans established and maintained by private employers48 or em-
ployee organizations, and plans to which an employer is required to
contribute under a collective bargaining agreement, are subject to Title
I of ERISA. Included within this broad rubric are plans that provide
current benefits such as medical, death, or disability benefits, vacation
pay, and bonuses in the form of stock in the employer company.49
These plans present little or no problem to a state court awarding marl-
42. Each particpant must receive a summary plan description (SPD) within 90 days
after becoming a participant, with 5 or 10 year updates. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1976). The
SPD describes the plan and identifies the administrators and trustees of the plan. Id.
§ 1022(b). One of the most challenging requirements of ERISA is that the SPD "be written
in a manner calculated to be understood by the plan participant." Id. § 1022(a)(1). See
Junewicz, Portfolio Theory and Pension Plan Disclosure, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1153 (1978);
Miller & Dorenfeld, ERISA: Adequate Summary Plan Descrolions, 14 Hous. L. REv. 835
(1977). Each participant also is entitled to request annually a statement of his or her bene-
fits, including a statement of when benefits will be nonforfeitable. 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)
(1976).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(b) (1976). The participant's rights to proceed against the
plan are discussed in Phillips, Civil Litigation Under the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ityAct of 1974, 49 Miss. L.J. 241 (1978); Note, Private Enforcement ofEmployees Retirement
income Security Act, 47 U. CiN. L. RFv. 272 (1978).
44. Codified primarily in I.R.C. §§ 401-415.
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1976).
46. Id. § 1222(a)(4). The task force was to have made a full study by September 2,
1976, of, inter alia, the effects and desirability of federal preemption of state and local law
with respect to matters relating to pension plans. Id § 1222(a). It failed to complete its
study by that date.
47. Id. §§ 1301-1381.
48. Public plans are expressly excluded from ERISA. See note 36 supra.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)-(3) (1976). Stock options should be considered part of the mar-
ital property. See, e.g., McNamara, Calpornia Community Property Aspects of Executive
Compensation, U.S. CAL. 1978 TAX. INST. 151, 152. This may produce the undesirable re-
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tal property to the nonemployee spouse; the benefits from such plans
either are currently enjoyable and distributable or do not represent a
right of the marital community, but rather of the individual spouse who
becomes entitled to them. For example, health insurance or annual
vacation pay either benefits the community during the marriage or in-
ures to the individual benefit of the employee upon separation or disso-
lution of the marriage.
50
The types of plans covered by Title I that are troublesome, and
which are the focus of this Article, are those plans that provide deferred
employee benefits, primarily in the form of post-retirement annuities or
other payments. The vast number of these plans also will be covered
by Title II, which covers tax "qualified" benefit plans within the in-
tendment of Internal Revenue Code sections 401-415. The coverage of
the two titles is not congruent, however; some plans will be covered
solely by Title 15 and others will be covered only by Title 11.52
Defined Benefit Plans
Essentially, there are two types of tax qualified deferred employee
benefit plans: defined benefit and defined contribution plans.5 3 De-
fined benefit plans, commonly thought of as pension plans, specify the
amount to be paid to an employee upon attainment of a stated age,
usually sixty-five,54 or some other event. The benefit in its simplest
suit, particularly in a closely held corporation, that nonemployee former spouses may own
stock in the company.
50. For example, in California, disability benefits paid after separation are the separate
property of the disabled employee spouse. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(c) (West Supp. 1980).
However, if the employee spouse may elect between regular retirement benefits and disabil-
ity benefits and he or she chooses the latter, an amount equivalent to the regular retirement
benefits will, to the extent attributable to employment during marriage, be treated as a com-
munity asset subject to disposition between the parties. In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal.
3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
51. Title I covers all employee plans which provide funded deferred benefits, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(2) (1976), even if they discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, and highly com-
pensated employees. Id. § 1051. Title II prohibits such discrimination for qualified plans.
I.R.C. § 401(a)(4). The advantage of having a plan "qualify" under Title II is that the em-
ployer may take an immediate deduction for contributions to the plan within the limits of
I.R.C. § 404; the assets accumulate tax free in the fund, I.R.C. § 501; and the participants
and beneficiaries are not taxed on benefits until actually distributed and then often at very
favorable income tax rates, I.R.C. § 402.
52. See note 51 supra.
53. I.R.C. § 414(1)-0).
54. The usual retirement provisions of pension plans also must meet the requirements
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as amendedby
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 1, 92
Stat. 189 (1978), which prevents mandatory retirement before age 70. See generally Note,
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form may be expressed as a fixed dollar amount payable monthly for
the life of the employee. More commonly, it is expressed as a percent-
age of the employee's compensation or as a percentage of compensa-
tion with a factor for years of service. There also may be a provision
for cost of living adjustments as well as an offset or reduction for Social
Security payments received by the participant.5" Essentially, these
plans provide an ascertainable income for the retirement years of the
participant or of the participant and his or her spouse.
The employer's contributions to a defined benefit plan are based
on actuarial calculations made after analyzing the employee population
covered by the particular plan. The factors used in the analysis include
age, sex, 56 rate of turnover, and assumed investment expectations,
which depend on the nature of the investment medium and its expected
return to the trust or custodial account. Employer contributions are
made to the fund as a whole and are not allocated to the account of any
specified participant prior to his or her termination of employment. A
defined benefit plan also may permit or require contributions from em-
ployees who are participants, but these contributions may be held in
individual accounts.57 If participants terminate employment prior to
acquiring a vested right to receive benefits upon retirement, the em-
ployer's future contributions are reduced by the amount forfeited by
such participants.
58
Certain significant consequences flow from the payment of ascer-
tainable retirement benefits under a defined benefit plan. First, the
plan and the trust or annuity policies that serve as its funding medium
cannot provide any other kind of benefits, including death benefits, un-
Mandatory Retirement and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1976, 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 927, 929.
55. I.R.C. § 415(d)(1). Plans that correlate benefits with Social Security are said to be
"integrated." Many defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans are "integrated."
The rules for properly integrating a qualified plan are complex and beyond the scope of this
Article. They are set out in Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 187, as updated by Rev. Rul. 75-
480, 1975-2 C.B. 131, and Rev. Rul. 76-76, 1976-1 C.B. 106. For a thorough discussion of
the concept of integration, see D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 166-90
(3d ed. 1975).
56. But see City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978) (which held that a requirement that women contribute more than men to a defined
benefit plan due to their greater longevity as a class violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964). See also Bernstein & Williams, Sex Discrimination in Pensions: Mfanhart'H olding
v. Mfanhart's Dictum, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1241 (1978).
57. I.R.C. §§ 41 1(b)(2), (c).
58. Rev. Rul. 60-73, 1960-1 C.B. 155. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(8); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-7(a)
(1963).
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less they are "incidental" to the primary retirement benefit. 59 The ex-
tent to which such benefits may be considered incidental has been
established by Internal Revenue Service regulations and rulings.
60
Moreover, a defined benefit plan generally cannot permit withdrawals
from the plan by participants prior to the time stated for benefit pay-
ments to commence, 6' although adequately secured loans may be made
to participants prior to that time.62 Somewhat surprisingly, once the
benefits become payable there is no comparable requirement that the
benefits be paid out over the lifetime of the retired participant; they
may be paid in a lump sum or over a period certain that may be less
than the expected remaining life span of the participant. 63 They may
not, however, be paid out in such a manner that their primary benefit is
to someone other than the participant and his or her surviving spouse.
64
Defined Contribution Plans
The other major type of qualified deferred employee benefit plan
is a defined contribution plan.65 Under this type of plan the employer
makes contributions of a definite amount each year. The amount is
either fixed, determined in accordance with a specified formula, or de-
termined by the employer annually.66 Contributions also may be re-
quired of or permitted from participants.67 In a defined contribution
plan, one or more accounts are established for each participant in the
plan. Employer contributions are allocated to the participants' ac-
counts in accordance with a set formula, which usually relates only to
compensation but may include a factor for years of service. 68 Amounts
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1976).
60. Id See also Rev. Rul. 69-523, 1969-2 C.B. 90; Rev. Rul. 61-121, 1961-2 C.B. 65.
61. See Rev. Rul. 74-254, 1974-1 C.B. 91; Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 2(o), 1969-2 C.B. 59.
ERISA does not appear to have changed the law in this regard.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(d)(2) (1978).
63. See Rev. Rul. 71-296, 1971-2 C.B. 202. However, a pension plan cannot provide
solely for distributions in a lump sum form. Rev. Rul. 62-195, 1962-2 C.B. 125.
64. Rev. Rul. 72-241, 1972-1 C.B. 108; Rev. Rul. 72-240, 1972-1 C.B. 108; Rev. Rul. 56-
656, 1956-2 C.B. 280. See Rev. Rul. 74-359, 1974-2 C.B. 129; Rev. Rul. 74-325, 1974-2 C.B.
127; Rev. Rul. 74-360, 1974-2 C.B. 130.
65. A defined contribution plan provides an individual account for each participant
and for benefits based solely on the participant's account balance. I.R.C. § 414(1).
66. See M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 3.12 (1977). Employer contribu-
tions to profit sharing or stock bonus plans can vary from year to year, but employer contri-
butions to money purchase plans must be made in accordance with a fixed formula.
67. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(1); I.R.C. § 41 l(c)(2)(C); Rev. Rul. 70-658, 1970-2 C.B. 86; Rev.
Rul. 69-421, 1969-2 C.B. 58.
68. See Rev. Rul. 68-653, 1968-2 C.B. 177; but see Rev. Rul. 68-654, 1968-2 C.B. 179
(factor for years of service not allowable if it results in discrimination in favor of highly
compensated employees).
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reflecting the participants' share in earnings of the fund and the ex-
penses of administration also will be credited or debited to each ac-
count. Amounts forfeited by participants whose employment
terminates prior to full vesting usually will be allocated to the accounts
of the remaining participants.
69
The allocation of funds to a participant's account does not neces-
sarily give the participant any rights to such amounts, but simply pro-
vides a means for determining that participant's present share of assets
in the plan. The participant will become entitled to his or her entire
account balance only when it has fully vested under the plan. In addi-
tion, the amount of benefits to which a particular participant ultimately
is entitled in a defined contribution plan depends entirely upon the
contributions credited to his or her account, the performance of the
investment medium, and, in stock bonus or profit sharing plans, the
turnover rate of other participants whose forfeited amounts may be al-
located to the accounts of the remaining participants.70 Thus, in a de-
fined contribution plan the benefits ultimately payable to a participant
will not be known with certainty until such benefits are to commence,
although the value of the accrued benefits always can be ascertained.
Within the category of defined contribution plan, there are two
subcategories. The first is the well-known "profit sharing" plan, whose
name suggests its genre. Employer contributions to a profit sharing
plan will be made if and only if the employer does in fact have "prof-
its" as the terms may be defined in the plan.71 Thus, under a profit
sharing plan, the level of benefits ultimately achieved is determined not
only by the amount of contributions the employer intends to make and
the return on such contributions, but also on the general prosperity of
the employer's business. A profit sharing plan must provide for with-
drawal of funds after a fixed number of years, the attainment of a
69. See I.R.C. § 414(1). Such allocations must not be made in a method which is dis-
criminatory in favor of the prohibited group of employees. See Ryan School Retirement
Trust v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 127, 133-34 (1955); I.R.C. § 401(a)(4). Allocations of forfeit-
ures made on the basis of account balances will not cause the plan to fail to qualify under
I.R.C. § 401 unless they result in the discrimination prohibited by I.R.C. § 401(a)(4), Rev.
Rul. 71-4, 1971-1 C.B. 120, but the Internal Revenue Service often may require that alloca-
tions be made in proportion to nondeferred compensation. The total "annual addition"
(which is the sum of employer contributions, a portion of employee contributions, if any,
and forfeitures to a participant's account) cannot exceed the lesser of $36,875 or 25% of the
participants' compensation. I.R.C. § 415(c)(l)-(2).
70. I.R.C. § 414(1).
71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2)(ii) (1976). "Profits" may be defined according to
generally accepted accounting principles and are not limited to taxable profits or "earnings
and profits." Rev. Rul. 66-174, 1966-1 C.B. 81, 82.
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stated age, or upon the occurrence of some hardship.72 In addition, the
plan may provide for incidental life insurance or accident or health
insurance.
73
In contrast, the second type of defined contribution plan, a money
purchase pension plan, is one in which the employer makes a commit-
ment to contribute a fixed amount to the plan regardless of the com-
pany's success.74 The amount may be a stated dollar amount or a
stated percentage of the participant's compensation. 75 The contribu-
tions and earnings thereon are allocated to participants' accounts as in
a profit sharing plan but are subject to some of the limitations of de-
fined benefit pension plans, including a prohibition of early withdraw-
als76 and restrictions against providing other types of benefits. Here,
too, participant forfeitures may reduce employer contributions.
77
ERISA Regulation
Every deferred employee benefit plan involves two broad sets of
rules. One set governs the employees and determines who shall be cov-
ered by the plan, how long they will have to remain in the plan to
become entitled to benefits, and when, and in what form, the benefits
will be paid out to the employee or to that employee's beneficiary. The
other set of rules governs the fiduciary and establishes the standards of
fiduciary responsibility for funding the plan and investing its assets.
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the rules governing coverage, vesting,
and distribution of benefits were based primarily on standards of rea-
sonableness and the exclusive benefit of the employees. 78 Such rules
are now subject to more stringent minimum standards under ERISA.
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii) (1976). The term "fixed number of years" is consid-
ered to mean at least two years. Rev. Rul. 73-553, 1973-2 C.B. 130; Rev. Rul. 7 1-295, 1971-2
C.B. 184. The regulation lists events which may be grouped under the term "hardship."
They are "layoff, illness, disability, retirement, death, or severance of employment." Treas.
Reg. § 1.401(b)(1)(ii) (1976). If the participant has the right to withdraw employer contribu-
tions, certain penalty provisions usually are included to avoid the constructive receipt of
income.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii) (1976). See Rev. Rul. 76-353, 1976-2 C.B. 112; Rev.
Rul. 69-421, 2(N), 1969-2 C.B. 59; Rev. Rul. 66-143, 1966-1 C.B. 79; Rev. Rul. 60-83, 1960-1
C.B. 157 (providing limits on amounts of life insurance which can be provided).
74. Rev. Rul. 73-379, 1973-2 C.B. 124.
75. M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 3.52 (1977).
76. Rev. Rul. 56-693, 1956-2 C.B. 282.
77. Rev. Rul. 60-73, 1960-1 C.B. 155.
78. For a discussion of these standards which highlighted their inadequacy and pro-
vided impetus for reform, see PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS
AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRI-
VATE PENSION PROGRAMS 70-79 (1965).
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Deferred employee benefit plans must include all employees who
have reached age twenty-five or who have completed one year of serv-
ice with the employer. 79 Once such employees become participants in
the plan, benefits begin to accrue on their behalf. Thus, most employ-
ees whose employers have established benefit plans will be included in
a plan or plans, unless they are subject to a collective bargaining agree-
ment that does not provide for coverage under such a plan.80 An em-
ployee may not be entitled to all or any of the benefits, however, if his
or her employment terminates prior to the time specified in the plan for
vesting of the benefits. Under any of the new minimum vesting sched-
ules mandated by ERISA, a participant must be fully vested in em-
ployer contributions after fifteen years of service with the employer and
must be entitled to at least half of his or her benefit after ten years of
service, although in many cases vesting may occur more rapidly.
8'
Thus, many participants in employee benefit plans are entitled to no
benefits or to a very small percentage of their benefits in the early years
of their employment with the employer but become irrevocably entitled
to substantial benefits simply by continuing in their present employ-
ment.8
2
Once an employee is included in the plan and has accumulated
vested benefits, the question arises as to when and in what form such
benefits will be paid.8 3 The payment of benefits must commence when
the participant has attained the retirement age specified in the plan, but
not later than the sixtieth day after the participant reaches age sixty-
79. I.R.C. § 410.
80. The bargaining must have been in good faith. I.R.C. § 410(b)(2)(A). Nonresident
aliens without United States source income also can be excluded. I.R.C. § 410(b)(2)(c).
81. I.R.C.§411.
82. Even if participants were to terminate employment and be rehired within a speci-
fied period of time, in general their prior service must be counted, provided they have not
withdrawn their vested benefits upon termination or, if they have done so, provided that
they agree to pay them back. I.R.C. § 411(a)(7)(B) & (C). This section provides that an
employee whose service is terminated may be paid the present value of his or her vested
benefit. If later rehired, he or she must have the opportunity to repay the amount so distrib-
uted, in which case the years of service prior to termination of employment will be counted
in determining his or her accrued benefit. A defined contribution plan may give the right to
repay only to employees who have been rehired within one year of termination (technically,
prior to a "one year break in service"). Terminated participants in defined benefit plans
have the right to buy back in to the plan for two years, but may be required to pay interest.
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(d)(4)(iv)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(d)(2)(ii)(1). These provisions
provide a real incentive to both employees and plan fiduciaries to defer payment of even
fully vested benefits until retirement.
83. The plan also must provide that benefits may not be assigned or alienated. 29
U.S.C. § 1056 (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13).
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five,8 4 has completed ten years of participation in the plan, or has ter-
minated employment, whichever occurs later.85 Because of adverse tax
consequences, benefits under a profit sharing plan are not likely to be
distributed to a participant who remains an active employee prior to
reaching age fifty-nine and one half.
86
When benefits become distributable, they may be paid in a lump
sum, in installments over a fixed period, or in the form of an annuity.
If the latter form of payment is available under a plan, ERISA
prescribes that it be in the form of a joint and survivor annuity for the
lives of the participant and his or her spouse,8 7 although a participant
may be given the option to elect a straight life annuity. If the benefits
are distributed in the form of a lump sum, then the employee may
"roll" them over into an individual retirement account (IRA) within
sixty days of receipt of the distribution. 88 If the distributee does choose
to roll over all or a portion of the lump sum distribution, that portion
rolled over will not be taxed to him or her.89 That portion which has
not been rolled over will be taxed at ordinary income rates.90 Benefits
also may be distributed directly from the trustee of one plan to the
trustee of another plan in which the employee is a participant.9'
Amounts held in an IRA, whether because of a rollover or because
of contributions made by an eligible employee,92 may not be distrib-
uted to the employee before he or she reaches the age of fifty-nine and
one-half. If amounts are distributed before that time they will be sub-
ject to an additional ten percent tax.93 Distribution must be com-
menced from an IRA before the employee reaches the age of seventy
and one-half.94 An IRA may be divided between the spouses on di-
84. See note 54 supra.
85. I.R.C. § 401(a)(14).
86. See I.R.C. §§ 402(a); 402(e)(4)(A)(ii). Tax aspects of distributions from qualified
plans are discussed at notes 206-62 & accompanying text infra.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(ll ).
88. I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5)(C), 408(d)(3).
89. I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5), 403(a)(4), (b)(8).
90. I.R.C. § 402(a)(6)(C).
91. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5). A self-employed person may roll over distributions from a Ke-
ogh plan only to an IRA. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(E)(ii).
92. Under I.R.C. § 219, an employee who is not an active participant in a qualified
plan may contribute the lesser of $1,500 or 15% of his or her earnings to an IRA and deduct
that amount in the year of contribution. If the employee has an unemployed spouse, he or
she may establish a "homemaker IRA" for that person and contribute equally to both IRAs
in a total amount not exceeding $1,750. I.R.C. § 220.
93. I.R.C. § 408(f).
94. I.R.C. § 408(a)(6).
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vorce with no adverse tax consequences at that time.95
As the foregoing descriptions suggest, the rules for establishing
and administering deferred employee benefit plans are quite complex.
ERISA does not mandate, however, either that plans be established by
or on behalf of employees or that they be continued once they are es-
tablished.96 Employee benefit plans covered by ERISA are private,
voluntary, consensual arrangements arising out of individual or collec-
tive bargaining agreements and are not created, funded, or adminis-
tered by the federal government. Congress merely enacted a federal
regulatory scheme to ensure that the stated goals of such plans are
achieved, by providing incentives for compliance in the form of tax
benefits97 and sanctions for violations in the form of fines, penalties, 98
and excise taxes.99
To further the goals of ERISA, protection of the nonemployee
spouse's interest in retirement benefits earned by the employee spouse
must not impair the financial integrity of the plan, must be simple and
cheaply administered, and must respect the interest of other partici-
pants, as well as the interests of both spouses. This requires legislation
that focuses on all of the issues arising out of recognition of the nonem-
ployee spouse's interest. Current legislative proposals simply provide
that the nonemployee spouse's interest may be paid at the same time
and in the same manner as the employee's benefit is paid without run-
ning afoul of the anti-assignment provisions of ERISA. 100 Such legisla-
tion does not go far enough to insure low cost, equitable, and efficient
administration of the nonemployee spouse's interest in employee bene-
fit plans.
If a portion of the benefits are to be paid to the nonemployee
spouse from the plan, the most important issue to be resolved is how
and when those benefits should be distributed. Subsidiary issues in-
volve rights of the nonemployee spouse to receive information regard-
ing the plan, to exercise independent elections under the plan over his
or her share of the benefits, and to sue the plan independently for
breach of fiduciary duties.
95. I.R.C. § 408(d)(6).
96. A plan must provide that all benefits are fully vested on termination of the plan,
however. I.R.C. § 411(d)(3).
97. I.R.C. §§ 402, 404.
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1132 (1976).
99. I.R.C. § 4975.
100. S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 128 (1979). The text of§ 128 of this bill is set out in
note 25 supra.
ERISA
Distribution of the Nonemployee Spouse's
Share of the Benefits
Matured Benefits
If the benefits in question are matured and currently payable, dis-
tribution should be simple. Once the benefits are matured, their value
is determinable and the nonemployee spouse's share then can be calcu-
lated easily. In distributing the benefits, the plan fiduciary should be
authorized, upon receipt of a certified court order,' 0 ' to make payments
to the nonemployee spouse. These payments could be made concur-
rently each month with payments to the employee spouse. 0 2 If this is
too onerous, the plan fiduciary could arrange to issue one check to the
superior court which had jurisdiction over the divorce 0 3 or to a desig-
nated nominee for the spouses. Another possibility would be for the
fiduciary to calculate the present value of the stream of payments to
which the nonemployee spouse is entitled and pay him or her in a lump
sum. Alternatively, the plan could buy a single premium, nontransfer-
able annuity in satisfaction of the nonemployee spouse's interest. 0
4
Whatever modes of payment are made available, the plan fiduciary
should have full discretion to determine the form of payment of bene-
fits105 and should not be required to use the same form of payment for
each spouse. 1
06
Most of the cases that have dealt with the marital property pre-
emption issue have involved matured and payable benefits, i e., benefits
in a pay status. 10 7 The courts have focused on whether the state laws
establishing the marital property rights have been preempted by
101. Filing of a certified court order with the plan is required under S. 209, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 128, 125 Cong. Rec. 555 (1979). It would certainly be sufficient notice to justify
payment to the former spouse.
102. This would be a "two check" situation. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled
that payments to a non-employee spouse pursuant to court order will not disqualify the plan
if the benefits are in pay status. Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-4 I.R.B. at 8 (alimony and child
support); Private Letter Ruling 7952045 (Sept. 25, 1979) (community property); Private Let-
ter Ruling 8010051 (Dec. 12, 1979) (alimony).
103. See In re Marriage of Fithian, 74 Cal. App. 3d 397, 141 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1977).
104. The factors necessary for such calculations are available to any actuary or to the
public. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10 (1970).
105. The plan fiduciary should be given this authority in the interest both of protecting
the plan and of preventing the Internal Revenue Service from ruling that the participant or
the nonemployee spouse constructively received income from the plan prior to actual distri-
bution by the plan fiduciary. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1971).
106. For example, the fiduciary may pay the employee spouse a joint and survivor annu-
ity, presumably for the joint lives of the participant and the second spouse, and pay the non-
employee spouse a lump sum.
107. See notes 14-32 & accompanying text supra.
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ERISA and whether payment to the nonemployee spouse violates
ERISA's anti-assignment provisions. An underlying issue, more rele-
vant here, which has been discussed by the courts only rarely is
whether the nonemployee spouse is a permissible distributee of benefits
from the plan. If not, distribution would be a breach of the "exclusive
benefit rule" which imposes general fiduciary duties on the trustee to
hold and manage plan assets for the exclusive benefit of participants or
their beneficiaries. 10 8
An employee is defined as any individual employed by an em-
ployer 09 or who is an owner-employee under Internal Revenue Code
Section 401(c)." 0 A beneficiary is defined as a person designated by an
employee participant or by the terms of the plan who is or who may
become entitled to receive benefits under the plan.11' Technically, an
employee's former spouse, whose interest in the benefits arises by oper-
ation of community property law, is neither an employee nor a benefi-
ciary. Distribution to such persons therefore may run afoul of the
exclusive benefit rule.
A recent Texas case, Kerbow v. Kerbow," 2 involved payments to
nonemployee spouses who sued to collect benefits directly from the
plan based on their community property claims. The court denied re-
covery solely on the basis that the former spouses were not "partici-
pants" or "beneficiaries" under the plan and therefore could not sue
under section 502 of ERISA. 1 3 More recently, however, the Internal
Revenue Service has adopted a contrary position, ruling that once the
benefits are in pay status a distribution may be made directly from the
plan to a nonemployee spouse in satisfaction of court-ordered alimony
and child support without disqualifying the plan." 4 In addition, it has
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1976).
109. Id. § 1002(6).
110. I.R.C. § 401(c).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1976).
112. 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
113. Id at 1260.
114. See note 102 supra. If a plan is disqualified, the employer will not be entitled to the
I.R.C. § 404 deduction for contributions to the trust unless they are fully vested in the par-
ticipants and individual accounts are maintained. Under I.R.C. §§ 83, 402(b), 404(a)(5), the
trust will lose its tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(a) since it no longer will relate to a
qualified plan under I.R.C. § 401(a), and the vested amounts with respect to amounts con-
tributed while the plan is unqualified immediately will become taxable to the employees on
whose behalf they are held even though such amounts may not be distributed currently
under the plan and trust to the employees in question. I.R.C. § 402(b); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.402(b)-1(b).
An unauthorized distribution also may constitute a prohibited transaction, defined in
I.R.C. § 4975(c), and cause the imposition of taxes under I.R.C. §§ 4975(a) & (b) on any
ERISA
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ruled that a community property interest may be distributed to the
nonemployee spouse from a Keogh plan when the employee reaches
age fifty-nine and one-half (which is the earliest time at which a distri-
bution may be made without incurring a penalty)." 5 Thus, there is
little doubt that a spouse is now a permissible distributee for purposes
of plan qualification under Title II. That result also should obtain
under the fiduciary rules of Title I.
Vested Unmatured Benefits
If benefits under the plan are not currently payable but are fully
vested, the problem of accommodating the nonemployee spouse's inter-
est in those benefits becomes more complex. Should the spouse be enti-
tled to immediate distribution of the vested benefits or should he or she
be required to wait for payment until benefits are paid to the employee?
At the present time, ERISA does not contemplate current distribu-
tion of vested but unmatured benefits, nor does Senate Bill 209.116 The
plan fiduciary thus is faced with a dilemma when confronted with a
state court decree calling for immediate payment of vested but unma-
tured benefits. A current distribution of the nonemployee spouse's in-
terest may affect the qualified status of the plan itself, because ERISA
or the plan may not permit distribution of benefits prior to such stated
events as the termination of employment by the employee, retirement,
disqualified person, defined in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2), who participates in the prohibited trans-
action (other than a fiduciary acting only as such).
Moreover, the plan fiduciary may be exposed to criminal or civil liability. ERISA
§ 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976), defines fiduciary duties. Under ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. §
1109(a) (1976), any person who is a fiduciary shall, among other things, be personally liable
to make good any losses to the plan resulting from breaches of a fiduciary's responsibility
and may be subject to other equitable or remedial relief. ERISA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131
(1976), imposes criminal penalties on any person convicted of willfully violating any provi-
sion of Subtitle B, Part 1 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1976). ERISA § 502,29 U.S.C.
§ 1132 (1976), deals with civil enforcement and the assessment and collection of civil penal-
ties relating to ERISA violations. For further discussion of the tax consequences to the plan,
the participants and the employer, see Stogel & Ervin, Keeping the Quaified Pension Plan
Qualed and Recognizing the Tax Effects of Disquaijfication, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 565.
115. Private Letter Ruling 7952045 (Sept. 25, 1979).
116. Section 128 of Senate Bill 209, S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 128, 125 Cong. Rec.
555 (1979), set out at note 25 supra, would permit payment from the plan in satisfaction of
marital property rights. Payment could be made, however, only in the "two check" situation
because the timing and form of benefit payments could not be altered under § 128. More-
over, the bill would not permit the nonemployee spouse to exercise independent elections
under the plan. The bill may permit a fiduciary to make a different form of payment to the
nonemployee spouse than to the employee, but would not permit state court decrees to re-
quire it to do so. See also Private Letter Ruling 8010051 (Dec. 12, 1979) (payment of court
ordered alimony will disqualify the plan when the benefits are not in pay status).
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death, disability, or attainment of a minimum age. On the other hand,
the plan fiduciary may risk contempt of court or at least expensive liti-
gation if it disregards a state court decree ordering immediate distribu-
tion to the nonemployee spouse. Like Pavlov's dogs, when confronted
with two opposing directives and no instructions on how to select which
to obey, the system has been suffering a proverbial nervous break-
down.1 17
Consequences of Premature Distributions
As noted previously, employer contributions to a pension plan
may not be withdrawn prior to termination of employment or attain-
ment of normal retirement age." 8 A contribution by the employer to a
profit sharing plan may be withdrawn two years after it has been made,
if the plan so provides." 9 Plans usually impose penalties for such with-
drawals to prevent constructive receipt by the employee of the entire
amount contributed on his or her behalf. Employee contributions
under a defined contribution plan may be withdrawn at any time, if so
provided in the plan, without affecting the tax status of the plan and
trust. Again, the plan itself may provide penalties for such withdraw-
als.' 20
Owner-employees who withdraw contributions prior to attainment
of age fifty-nine and one-half are subject to a ten percent penalty tax.12
This penalty tax also applies to early distribution from an IRA.
22
Thus, a distribution of unmatured benefits from the trust at the time of
dissolution may violate requirements of the Internal Revenue Service
and thereby jeopardize the qualified status of the plan. It may violate
the terms of the plan, subjecting the fiduciary to charges of breach of
fiduciary duty, or it may result in penalty taxes assessed against the
employee.
117. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489,
489 (1954).
118. See notes 61, 76 & accompanying text supra.
119. See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
120. The tax consequences to the employee of in-service withdrawals are discussed in
Lamon & Lee, Pre-Retirement Qualbtfed Plan Pay-outs under ERISA, 9 CuM. L. REV. 83,
121-27 (1978).
121. I.R.C. § 72(m)(5). Under a contract purchased by an exempt trust, an insurance
company loan received by an owner-employee or the pledge of an owner-employee's interest
in a trust also will be treated as a distribution to the owner-employee. I.R.C. § 72(m)(4)(B).
122. I.R.C. § 408(0(1). However, certain transfers of IRAs between spouses in connec-
tion with marital dissolutions are permitted without adverse tax consequences to either
spouse. See I.R.C. § 408(d)(6).
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Loans as Current Cashout Devices
Qualified plans may provide for nondiscriminatory loans to par-
ticipants, secured by their vested benefits under the plan, without en-
dangering the qualifed status of the plan. 12 3 At the present time an
employee spouse may borrow the amount necessary to satisfy the non-
employee spouse's interest in the plan at the time of dissolution, pro-
viding the loan is adequately secured, bears a reasonable rate of
interest, and is repayable within a reasonable period of time. 12 4
The use of participant loans to satisfy the nonemployee spouse's
interest is a standard technique. Its use is not without risk, however.
First, an employee ordinarily would not be ordered to borrow against
future retirement benefits. 2 5 Consequently, the nonemployee spouse
cannot be assured of a current distribution through the loan device.
Second, the Internal Revenue Service may contend that a loan for a
protracted period actually is a premature distribution. Such a ruling
may have adverse tax consequences for the employee and, if premature
distributions are not authorized in a profit sharing plan or if they are
made from a pension plan, may result in plan disqualification. 12 6
Third, if the loan is to an owner-employee or from an individual retire-
ment account it would be treated as a distribution, thus subjecting the
employee to a penalty tax.' 27 Finally, if the loan is to a key employee
whose interest represents a substantial portion of the assets in the trust,
the Internal Revenue Service may assert that there has been a partial or
complete termination of the plan.
28
Proposed Mandatory Rollover IRA
For the reasons outlined above, there is currently no totally satis-
factory method of paying out the nonemployee spouse's interest while
the employee is employed. Nevertheless, current distribution is highly
desirable, particularly in a defined contribution plan.
In a defined contribution plan, when the benefits are fully vested
current distribution of the nonemployee spouse's interest makes good
sense. Because the accrued benefit is equal to the balance standing in
123. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13); Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-13(d)(2) (1978).
124. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(13), 4975(d)(1); Rev. Rul. 71-437, 1971-2 C.B. 185. See also
Roberts, Participant Loansfrom QualXiedPlans-A Look after ERISA, 57 TAXES 238 (1979).
125. Thiede, supra note 4, at 649.
126. For a discussion of the consequences of disqualification of the plan, see note 114
supra.
127. I.R.C. § 4975(d).
128. See IR.C. § 41 1(d)(3); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1343 (1976).
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the participant's account as of a particular date, the nonemployee
spouse's share may be ascertained easily. Withdrawal of the funds does
not threaten the financial integrity of the plan because each partici-
pant's interest depends on his or her own account and not on the over-
all size of the fund.
Current distribution may be less desirable if a defined benefit plan
is involved. This is because the benefits are funded through actuarial
calculations which consider employer contributions, plan earnings, and
anticipated forfeitures to ensure payment of a fixed level of benefits.129
The financial integrity of the plan may be jeopardized by the prema-
ture distribution of benefits to a nonemployee spouse because such dis-
tributions would affect the actuarial factors used to fund the plan.
In a defined contribution plan where benefits are vested, and often
in a defined benefit plan similarly vested, segregation of the nonem-
ployee spouse's interest and removal from the plan often will be desira-
ble because of the attendant reduction in the administrative burdens of
handling that interest. 130 ERISA should be amended to authorize dis-
tributions, in the sole discretion of the plan fiduciary, of the nonem-
ployee spouse's interest in retirement benefits in either a defined
contribution or defined benefit plan, even if benefits are not currently
payable to the employee. 131 The plan administrator could balance the
competing concerns while keeping the overall interest of the plan fore-
most in mind. State court orders are unlikely to do this.
Several aspects of a current distribution of unmatured benefits to
the nonemployee spouse nonetheless are troublesome. First, it does not
seem desirable to pay one spouse currently while the other spouse must
wait until some future time to receive payment. In the extreme case,
the possibility of a current distribution might lead to a divorce for the
sole purpose of securing current distribution of at least the nonem-
129. See I.R.C. § 412 (establishing minimum funding standards for qualified employee
benefit plans).
130. The spectre of onerous administrative costs to the plan if the nonemployee spouse
is given the right to collect benefits therefrom often is raised in support of preemption of
such interests. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, Seafarer's International Union at 13; Briefs
amicus curiae filed in support of Appellant by Carpenter's Pension Trust of Southern Cali-
fornia, at 22-27, and by the ERISA Industry Committee at 11-18, Stone v. Stone, 450 F.
Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), apfpeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978).
131. The nonemployee spouse's interest should be determined by a final state court de-
cree. This is the solution adopted by Senate Bill 209, S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 5
U.S.C. § 8345(h) (Supp. 111978). The decree should contain sufficient information to deter-
mine the benefits payable to the spouse. See Hearings Be/ore the Commn on Labor and
Human Resources, United States Senate, on S. 209, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 589-601 (1979).
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ployee spouse's share of the benefits.1 32 At best, current distribution to
the nonemployee spouse could have a psychologically damaging im-
pact on employee morale and diminish the incentive for long term em-
ployment which is the hallmark of employee benefit plans providing
deferred benefits.
Second, current distribution undermines one of the major goals of
ERISA, which is to provide for financial security of employees and
their spouses during retirement years.133 While profit sharing plans
partake less of this goal than pension plans, 134 both profit sharing and
pension plans contemplate accumulation during earning years for dis-
tribution during retirement years. Current distributions do not com-
port with that goal.
ERISA already contains the machinery to handle this problem.
Individual retirement accounts, which afford employees a modified
form of retirement benefit portability, 135 can be adapted easily to ac-
commodate the interest of the nonemployee spouse to the goals of
ERISA. ERISA should be amended to provide that if distribution of
unmatured benefits are made to a nonemployee spouse, such distribu-
tions must be made to an IRA on his or her behalf. The requirement
should be mandatory, not elective, on the part of the spouse. The funds
so distributed thus would be kept in a "retirement plan solution" until
the nonemployee spouse reached age fifty-nine and one-half or
older, 136 without involving the plan in continued administration of
those funds. Distribution to a mandatory IRA from a qualified plan
also would be consistent with the tax free IRA division between the
spouses on divorce already authorized by Internal Revenue Code Sec-
tion 408(d)(6). 137 Distributions to an existing IRA or to the nonem-
ployee spouse's own qualified plan also should be permitted.
132. There is already substantial impetus to divorce under the tax laws. Compare I.R.C.
§ l(a) (taxes imposed on married individuals) with I.R.C. § l(c) (taxes imposed on unmar-
ried individuals). See Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40; Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d
896 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Tax Law's So Funny It Breaks Couple Up, IRS Isn't Laughing, Wall St.
J., Dec. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1976).
134. The regulations define a profit sharing plan as one established "to enable employ-
ees or their beneficiaries to participate in the profits of the employer's trade or business."
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2)(ii) (1976). A pension plan is established "to provide for the live-
lihood of the employees or their beneficiaries after the retirement of such employees."
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-I(a)(2)(i) (1976).
135. See I.R.C. § 408. See also IRS, PUBLICATION 590, TAX INFORMATION ON INDIVID-
UAL RETIREMENT SAVINGS PROGRAMS (1979).
136. I.R.C. § 408(f)(1) imposes a 10% penalty on distributions prior to age 591/. The
penalty is measured by the amount of the distribution.
137. I.R.C. § 408(d)(6) permits tax free division of individual retirement accounts inci-
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Nonvested or Partially Vested Benefits
Benefits that are nonvested or partially vested present several
problems. First, in many jurisdictions retirement benefits may not be
considered marital property until they are fully vested. 138 Second,
where nonvested benefits are included as marital property, valuation of
the benefit is very difficult. If retirement benefits are not vested at the
time of dissolution, valuation depends in part on the likelihood of the
employee remaining on the job until full vesting occurs. 139 Conse-
quently, state courts often reserve jurisdiction over retirement benefits
that are nonvested and dispose of them only when payable. 140 Third,
distribution of nonvested benefits is not permitted under ERISA and
would be a breach of fiduciary duty because of the. adverse impact it
would have on funding of the benefits of other plan participants. 41
Therefore, distribution of nonvested benefits should not be permitted
upon divorce.
If benefits are nonvested, or, in the case of vested unmatured bene-
fits, if the plan fiduciary decides not to distribute currently,142 then dis-
tribution may be postponed for years. In that event, some method must
be devised for ensuring that benefits are paid to the nonemployee
spouse at the future time. One suggestion would require a court order
to be served on a plan within ninety days of the commencement of
benefits for the distribution to be effective.143 This would require the
nonemployee spouse to keep track of the employment status of the em-
ployee spouse for years after their relationship had been severed by
divorce.
In the alternative, as in other areas, the mechanism which exists in
ERISA may be modified to solve the problem. The whereabouts of the
nonemployee spouse could be monitored by treating such a spouse as a
"separated participant" under the plan. Plan administrators currently
dent to divorce. See also I.R.C. § 220, which permits deductions to an IRA on behalf of a
nonemployed spouse when the employee spouse also maintains an IRA.
138. See note 8 supra.
139. For one method of valuing nonvested benefits, see Projector, Valuation of Retire-
ment Benefits in Marital Dissolution, 50 L.A.B. BULL. 229 (1975).
140. See note I 1 & accompanying text supra.
141. In a defined contribution plan, benefits which are forfeited by participants who
terminate before full vesting may be allocated to the account of remaining participants.
LR.C. § 414(1). In a defined benefit plan, forfeitures are anticipated in the actuarial projec-
tions for funding the plan and therefore reduce employer contributions. See text accompa-
nying notes 58, 69, 75, 77 supra.
142. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
143. See Hearings Before the Comn on Labor and Human Resources, United States Sen-
ate, on . 209, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 589-601 (1979).
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are required to file a form with the Social Security Administration on
behalf of separated employee participants identifying their interests in
the plan,144 with the expectation that a participant whose employment
terminated prior to retirement will be notified of the existence of bene-
fits when he or she becomes eligible for Social Security. Similarly, the
nonemployee spouse who is not going to receive immediate distribution
can be registered as a "separated participant" and notified of the exist-
ence of benefits when becoming eligible for Social Security. In this
way, plan fiduciaries need neither continuously monitor the employ-
ment status of former spouses nor depend on employees to keep track
of their former husbands and wives. Plan fiduciaries who treat former
nonemployee spouses as separated participants should be protected to
the same extent that they are protected for separated employee partici-
pants regarding payment of benefits.
The concept of a "separated participant" requires some modifica-
tion when applied to a former spouse. If the nonemployee spouse's
interest is undistributed because it is nonvested, then his or her benefit
should continue to vest but should not continue to accrue if the em-
ployee spouse continues in the service of the employer. This means
that benefits which have accrued at the valuation date (which in a de-
fined contribution plan would be the account balance and in a defined
benefit plan would be the benefit accrued under the plan's provisions)
would become nonforfeitable to the same extent they would have if the
spouses had remained married. The benefits would not increase, how-
ever, either through additions to the account or additional accruals of
defined benefits. 14
5
A final issue concerns the disposition of the nonemployee spouse's
144. I.R.C. § 6057(a), Form 5500, also known as Schedule SSA.
145. In the remote event that a nonemployee spouse subsequently becomes an employee
of his or her former spouse's employer, the years of indirect service accrued solely by virtue
of marriage should not be included in determining the nonemployee's rights as a new par-
ticipant. Years of service are defined in I.R.C. §§ 410 & 411. Regulations relating to the
concepts of "year of service," "hour of service," and "break in service" have been promul-
gated by the Secretary of Labor. Rules and Regulations for Minimum Standards for Em-
ployee Pension Benefit Plans, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2530.200b-1 to -9 (1979). Generally speaking, a
participant credited with 1000 hours of service during a 12 consecutive month period (the
"computation period") must be credited with a year of service. I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(5)(A); 29
C.F.R. § 2530.200b-l(a) (1979). An hour of service is each hour for which an employee is
paid or entitled to be paid during the applicable computation period for performance of
duties, and for vacation, illness, jury duty, layoff, military duty, or leave of absence. 29
C.F.R. § 2530.200b-2(a)(1) & (2) (1979). A one year break in service is a plan year in which
a participant has 500 hours of service or less. I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(6)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-
4(a)(1). Service prior to a one year break in service must still be counted for vesting pur-
poses if an employee has completed one year of service after the one year break in service.
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benefits if his or her whereabouts are unknown at the time of distribu-
tion. The issue, which arises whenever there are separated participants
whose interests become payable years after their employment has ter-
minated, presently is unresolved. 146 The question uniquely confronting
the plan fiduciary when the disappearing distributee is a former non-
employee spouse is whether the full benefit should be paid to the em-
ployee or should revert to the participants as a whole.
Again, common sense should prevail. The employee spouse
should be entitled to the full benefit if the nonemployee spouse does
not come forth to claim his or her share. Arguably, once the nonem-
ployee spouse's interest is severed, the employee spouse's claim to it is
no greater than that of any other participant. However, that argument
ignores the fact that the employee spouse did earn the benefit. The
policy reasons that mandate sharing of the benefit with a spouse whose
efforts indirectly contributed to earning the benefit do not necessarily
extend to sharing it with coworkers when that spouse cannot be found
to be paid his or her share.
Death Benefits
Retirement plans often provide benefits after the death of the em-
ployee. The nature of the death benefit depends on the type of plan
and the form of benefit distribution selected.
Death Ben§6ts Under a Dft6ned Contribution Plan
In a defined contribution plan, the total benefit payable to the em-
ployee at any time is determined by the balance in his or her account as
of the relevant valuation date.1 47 The typical death benefit accruing
prior to commencement of payment in a defined contribution plan is
simply the balance in the account of the participant on the date of
death.
The benefit payable on death after termination of employment de-
I.R.C. § 411(a)(6)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-4(b). This issue, although remote should be
delineated in amended regulations under I.R.C. § 411.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4(b)(6) (1977) provides that state escheat laws work a per-
missible forfeiture of benefits where participants cannot be found. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1521 (West Supp. 1980). Of course, proponents of total preemption may argue that
such state laws are themselves preempted. See, e.g., Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemp-
tion of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L.
REv. 23 (1978). The Labor Department issued an advisory opinion stating that California
escheat laws are preempted by ERISA. Advisory Opinion 79-31, 252 PENSION REPORTER
(BNA) A-18 (May 14, 1979).
147. I.R.C. §411(a)(7).
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pends on the mode of distribution selected, but in any case is computed
only with reference to the undistributed account balance of the em-
ployee. Typically, there are three optional modes of settlement: lump
sum; payment for a period certain; or an annuity, either for the lifetime
of the participant alone or for the joint lives of the participant and
spouse.
A lump sum distribution of the entire balance in the account
would terminate the employee's interest in the plan. In contrast, an
installment or annuity payment may involve payments after the death
of the employee. Because the total amount of benefits payable depends
entirely on the amount in the employee's account at retirement, pay-
ments made during the lifetime of the employee would, however, be
reduced in anticipation of the death benefit payments. The property
interest of the nonemployee spouse in a defined contribution plan
nonetheless should be no different if payments are spread out over a
period of years or made in a lump sum. The measure of the benefit is
the same-the employee's account balance-whether paid during life
or after death.
Death Benefits Under a Defned Benefit Plan
A defined benefit plan may provide for no death benefit other than
a refund of the employee contributions made prior to retirement.'
48
Typically, however, a plan will provide for a benefit payable to the
surviving spouse if death occurs prior to commencement of payment to
the participant. The amount of benefits payable would be equal to the
accrued benefits of that participant, whether or not vested. 149 The
death benefit available after benefit payments have commenced de-
pends on the mode of payment selected. If a joint and survivor annuity
is selected, the death benefit payable to the surviving spouse must equal
at least one half of the benefit payable during the joint lives of the
participant and the surviving spouse, but cannot exceed such lifetime
benefit. The total benefit paid over the joint lives must be the actuarial
equivalent of a single life annuity for the life of the participant.' 5° As
in a defined contribution plan, the lifetime benefits of the participant
will be reduced if death benefits are to be paid, unless the plan provides
that they be funded separately.
148. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6057(a), Form 5500 (Question 4).
149. See M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS at app. C, § 5.3, at 598 for an
example of a provision relating to a preretirement death benefit in a defined benefit plan.
150. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(G)(iii).
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Death Benefits and the Terminable Interest Rule
Postdeath payments from the plan involve three separate questions
which usually are erroneously intermingled in discussions of the sub-
ject. The first question is whether the nonemployee spouse has an in-
terest in such benefits which should be evaluated in determining the
amount of his or her marital property interest in the retirement bene-
fits. The second question is whether the nonemployee spouse may col-
lect or continue to collect an interest from the plan after the death of
the former spouse. The last issue is whether the plan should distribute
any unpaid portion of the nonemployee spouse's interest to that
spouse's estate or should terminate his or her interest if he or she prede-
ceases the employee. These questions, while left unanswered under
ERISA, have been the focus of much attention in California. Califor-
nia's solution to the problem, via development of the so-called "termi-
nable interest rule," is instructive in devising a scheme which will work
under ERISA.
The terminable interest rule in California, as interpreted by
cases 51 and commentators, 52 stands for the proposition that the inter-
est of the nonemployee spouse in retirement benefits earned during
marriage is limited to an interest in the benefits paid during the joint
lives of both spouses. As such, the rule is justly subject to criticism as
unfairly depriving the nonemployee spouse of the full measure of the
marital property which is part of "the joint effort that comprises the
community."' 53 Analysis of the terminable interest rule, however, has
151. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 577 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974), disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, 15
Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976); Waite v. Waite, 6
Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972), disapproved on other grounds in In re
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641
(1976); Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649,33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963);
Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976); In re Marriage of Freiberg,
57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1976); In re Marriage of Breugl, 47 Cal. App. 3d
201, 120 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1975), disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, 15
Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976); Frazier v. Tulare
County Bd. of Retirement, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 117 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1974); In re Marriage
of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974), disapproved on other grounds in
In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641
(1976); Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972), disapproved on
other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126
Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976); Berry v. Board of Retirement, 23 Cal. App. 3d 757, 100 Cal. Rptr.
549 (1972).
152. An exhaustive analysis of the rule is found in Reppy, supra note 4, at 443-82. See
also Thiede, supra note 4, at 638.
153. Reppy, supra note 4, at 482.
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failed to consider the type of plan involved, the type of death benefit
involved, or the procedural manner in which the issue was raised.
Consequently, the rule has been misconstrued and misapplied in later
cases and has been overly simplified by its academic detractors.
The origin of the terminable interest rule lies in cases relating to
the right to terminate or amend state and local public retirement pro-
grams in derogation of the nonemployee spouse's right to benefits.
54
In Packer v. Board ofRetirement,155 the California Supreme Court held
that a policeman's widow was not entitled to a widow's pension when
her husband failed to elect a survivor benefit pursuant to a change in
the law made after his employment had commenced. The court recog-
nized that a pension to an employee's widow "is one of the elements of
compensation held out to her husband"' 56 and even conceded "that the
husband's pension rights derived from his employment during mar-
riage are community property."'' 57 The court held, however, that those
factors "[did] not furnish any basis for the claim that the widow has a
separate, vested right to a pension that is different from her community
interest in her husband's pension rights." 158 Consequently, because her
husband's pension rights could be modified during his employment, the
widow's rights therein could be similarly modified.
Given the principle established in Packer that a widow's entitle-
ment to pension benefits is terminated when the employee dies, it
should come as no surprise that the court in Benson v. City ofLos Ange-
les159 held that a former spouse is not entitled to claim the death bene-
fit as a "widow" but only as a holder of a community property interest
therein, the value of which must be determined prior to the death of the
employee. 60 The California Supreme Court in Benson was faced with
the narrow question of whether a former spouse was entitled to collect
a widow's benefit from the plan after the death of the employee when
no disposition of the pension had been made in the prior divorce and
the employee had remarried. The court held that the City need only
comply with the terms of the employee's employment contract and
make payments to the employee during his lifetime and on his death to
his widow. 16 1 When the employee died, the first wife's status with re-
154. Id at 446.
155. 35 Cal. 2d 212, 217 P.2d 660 (1950).
156. Id at 215, 217 P.2d at 662.
157. Id at 216, 217 P.2d at 663.
158. Id
159. 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963).
160. Id at 358, 384 P.2d at 650, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
161. Id at 360, 384 P.2d at 651-52, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
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spect to the plan remained as co-owner of the employee's interest in the
plan. That status limited her rights against the plan; a nonemployee
spouse's rights are derived from the rights accorded an employee under
the plan and are defined by the terms of the plan and by elections made
by the employee under the plan. Accordingly, the only right which
could be asserted against the plan was to enforce payments to his
widow, te., his second wife.
162
The court did not deny the former spouse the right to have the
total benefits considered part of the community on divorce. Justice
Peek stated:
This is not to say that upon a division of the community estate
she could not have participated therein. Undoubtedly she had an
interest which she could have asserted in the payments to [the em-
ployee] during his lifetime, had she sought to do so. But after [the
employee's] death the only right remaining was to enforce the city's
covenant to make payments to the "widow."
163
As this passage indicates, there is nothing in Benson to preclude a
court from considering the survivor's benefit as part of the pension
package earned during marriage and thus divisible on dissolution. Ben-
son, however, has been interpreted by lawyers and courts in later cases
as denying the nonemployee spouse any right to survivor benefits. 16
This view of Benson is incorrect for two reasons. First, it overlooks the
distinction preserved in Benson between the right of the nonemployee
spouse to a portion of the total pension package because of her commu-
nity property interest therein and her right to the benefit as a widow, a
status which she, as the former spouse, did not possess on the em-
ployee's death. Second, later cases have failed to analyze the death
benefit at issue in Benson and thus have extended the rule of that case
to fact situations in which it is clearly inapplicable.
165
162. Id at 360, 384 P.2d at 652,33 Cal. Rptr. at 260. The only right a surviving nonem-
ployee spouse may have to postdeath benefits in a public retirement plan is to enforce the
contract between the employee and the retirement system, even if that means he or she will
receive no benefit. See Frazier v. Tulare County Bd. of Retirement, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1046,
117 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1974) (holding that an amendment to the plan permitting a surviving
spouse to elect a death benefit was void as against a member of the plan who had previously
designated a woman other than his wife as his beneficiary; since the amendment was void as
to him, the surviving spouse could not claim the widow's benefit for which the statutes ex-
pressly provided).
163. 60 Cal. 2d at 360, 384 P.2d at 652, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
164. See cases cited at note 151 supra, with the exception of Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976). In the later cases, all of the lawyers representing the
nonemployee spouse conceded, either explicitly, or implicitly by failing to argue, that the
spouse had no interest in death benefits.
165. See cases cited note 151 supra.
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The death benefit in Benson was unrelated to years of service.166 It
was payable only to the dependents of any members of the Fire or Po-
lice Department who die as a result of injury or sickness suffered dur-
ing performance of their duties or after retirement and was payable
only during the period of their dependency. Furthermore, the death
benefit was not optional, was not payable if there were no dependents,
and involved no reduction of the lifetime pension payable to the em-
ployee.1 67 A court faced with the type of death benefit in Benson at the
time of divorce arguably could find that the employee had no property
interest in the benefit 168 and correspondingly no marital property inter-
est therein.
By contrast, the death benefit at issue in Packer, which allowed the
employee to choose to have a lifetime benefit reduced in return for a
death benefit payable to the surviving spouse, is the more usual type of
death benefit. This type of benefit undoubtedly is a part of the pension
earned during marriage. Extension of the terminable interest rule to
such elective death benefits deprives the nonemployee spouse of his or
her full marital property.
169
At least one case in California has recognized that the nonem-
ployee spouse has a community property interest in death benefits pay-
able under a private retirement plan. In Patillo v. Norris,170 two ex-
wives claimed a union pension fund death benefit against the desig-
nated beneficiary. The Court of Appeal relied on the:
[b]asic principle involved in the case of a married man who
166. See CHARTER OF CITY OF Los ANGELES art. XVII, § 183 (1937, amended 1947).
167. See id § 181.
168. For federal estate tax purposes decedents are considered to have no interest in
death benefits with respect to which there is no contract or agreement and to which the
decedent has no voice in designation of beneficiaries. See All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1963); Estate of Barr v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 227 (1963), acq., 1964-1 (Part 1) C.B. 4;
Rev. Rul. 76-501, 1976-2 C.B. 267 and rulings cited therein.
169. Death benefits under ERISA necessarily will reduce lifetime payments. See notes
147-49 & accompanying text supra.
170. 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976). Professor Reppy apparently over-
looked this case in his compendium on the terminable interest rule. Reppy, supra note 3.
He also failed to note that the version of California Civil Code § 4363.2 in existence at the
time of his Article permitted a plan to have a joinder order set aside on the ground that it
had been ordered to make payments of benefits to the nonemployee spouse after the death of
either spouse. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4363.2(c)(3)-(4) (1977) (amended 1978). This provision
apparently would negate Professor Reppy's argument in chief that the principal fallacy in
the terminable interest rule was that it was not explicitly based on legislation but operated in
derogation of statutorily created rights. Reppy, supra note 3, at 481. Section 4363.2(c),
which has since been amended to delete any reference to death benefit limitations, briefly
imbedded the terminable interest rule firmly in the legislative foundation Professor Reppy
found lacking.
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designates someone other than his wife as the named beneficiary. To
the extent.. . the benefits were earned by the husband from his em-
ployer during the marriage, on his death the wife is entitled to set
aside the gift made to the named beneficiary without consideration
and without her consent to the extent of one half of the community
property interest.
171
Although the marital relationships of the employee decedent were
quite entangled and the record "sketchy and in some respects inade-
quate,"'172 the court held that the benefit should be allocated in accord-
ance with the funds attributable to the husband's employment for the
duration of each relationship. 173 The court remanded for further deter-
mination of the actual length of each relationship.'
74
With respect to ERISA-regulated private plans, there is no reason
to exclude death benefits from the marital property rights in retirement
benefits. If division of the retirement benefit is made at the time of
divorce, the value of the death benefit can be determined actuarially in
the case of defined benefit plans. The value of the benefit will be in-
cluded automatically in the value of the participant's account in a de-
fined contribution plan.' 75 If a court retains jurisdiction, an allocation
between the current and the former spouse can be made in the same
manner as in Patillo, using the same time rule method which applies to
lifetime benefits.'
76
Nothing in ERISA prevents this result. ERISA does require that
plans which provide for payment of benefits in the form of an annuity
must provide for benefits "in a form having the effect of a qualified
joint and survivor annuity."' 177 That provision, however, shows no
preference for the surviving spouse over the former spouse. For exam-
ple, the requirement would not apply to plans which only provide for
benefits in the form of lump sum payments or payments for a period
171. 65 Cal. App. 2d at 217, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (citing, inter alia, Benson v. City of
Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963)).
172. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 212, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
173. Id at 218-19, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
174. Id. at 217, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
175. See notes 147-50 & accompanying text supra. Notably, this mode of division can
only be provided for on divorce if the aggregate theory of community assets is used. On
death, the surviving spouse's interest in each particular asset must be awarded under an item
theory. See W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
444-45,464-65 (1975). Thus the line of cases cited by Reppy as "anti-Benson" are inapposite
because they involve the surviving spouse's community property interest in the benefit itself,
rather than an interest at divorce where equivalent other property may be awarded. Id at
458-62.
176. See note 11 su.pra.
177. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(ll)(A).
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certain. 178 Moreover, plans may permit participants to elect out of the
joint and survivor form of annuity by choosing some other form of
payout, including a payment for the life of the participant alone 179 or to
a beneficiary other than the surviving spouse. 180 Finally, the plan is not
required to subsidize a benefit for the survivor, but may reduce lifetime
benefits instead.'l8 In short, the death benefit payable to surviving
spouses under ERISA differs significantly from that offered under fed-
erally funded retirement systems, including the Social Security Act and
the Railroad Retirement Act, 182 in that it is optional with the plan and
elective by the participant. Accordingly, the joint and survivor annuity
provision under ERISA cannot be construed to indicate a particular
intent by Congress to provide for surviving spouses to the exclusion of
former spouses.
In Waite v. Waite, 183 the California Supreme Court extended the
rule in Benson to cover the issue of whether the nonemployee spouse's
interest in the plan ceases on his or her death as well as on the death of
the employee. Judge Waite and his wife divided all their community
property except their respective pension rights upon separation in 1967.
Thereafter, the Judge became a permanent resident of Nevada and was
awarded his pension rights in an exparte divorce proceeding in that
state. His wife then filed for divorce in California, naming the State
Comptroller, as administrator of the Judge's Retirement Fund, as an
additional party. In disposing of the community property interest in
the Judge's retirement fund, the trial court ordered the Comptroller to
pay to the wife or her devisees or heirs one half of all the benefits paya-
ble under the Judges' Retirement Act. 8 4
On appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed itself solely to
the question of the mode of division of the benefits. Justice Tobriner
178. See, e.g., PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING FORMS (P-H), 30,605-30,606 (1977),
for the Internal Revenue Service Model Profit Sharing Plan and Internal Revenue Service
Model Money Purchase Plan. Neither provides for payment in the form of an annuity.
179. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e)-(f) (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(E)-(F).
180. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e)-(f) (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)( 11)(E)-(F). If an employee does des-
ignate a beneficiary other than his or her spouse, the consent of the spouse should be se-
cured. See J. ROBINSON & D. SOLOMON, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO PENSION AND PROFIT
SHARING PLANS §§ 4.44, 5.38, 6.45 (1973).
181. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 67-68, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4670, 4732-33.
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976); 45 U.S.C. §§ 201-231 (1976).
183. 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972), disapproved on other grounds in
In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641
(1976).
184. 6 Cal. 3d at 466, 492 P.2d at 16, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
[Vol. 31
found that lifetime pensions under the Judges' Retirement Act attribu-
table to earnings during marriage were community property and, rely-
ing improperly on Benson, excluded any right to a widow's benefit.'8 5
The appellate court decision, which had precluded any payments to the
wife's devisees or heirs, was upheld. As a result, the wife's community
interest in pension benefits would yield payments to her during her life-
time only:
The state's concern ... lies in provision for the subsistence of
the employee and his spouse, not in the extension of benefits to such
persons or organizations the spouse may select as the objects of her
bounty. Once the spouse dies. of course, her need for subsistence
ends, and the state's interest in her sustenance reaches a coincident
completion. When this termination occurs, the state's concern nar-
rows to the sustenance of the retired employee; its pension payments
must necessarily be directed to that sole objective.
186
Consistent with that concern, the employee's estate would be entitled to
nothing more than a refund of the employee's unrecovered contribu-
tions. 187 The only benefit payable after the death of the employee out
of state funds would be to the employee's surviving spouse.' 8 Thus,
the court concluded that because the Judges' Retirement Act restricted
payments of state funded benefits to the employee or the surviving
spouse, the state administrator could not be required to make postdeath
payments out of state funds to the nonemployee spouse's estate.
189
Justice Tobriner's opinion was in response to the Comptroller's as-
sertion that he could not be obligated to make any payments to the
former spouse but could only be required to make payments to the per-
sons enumerated in the statute-retired judges and their spouses, desig-
nated beneficiaries, and children-none of which included a former
spouse. 190 Thus, Justice Tobriner's concern in limiting the wife to pay-
ments for her lifetime was for the protection of the integrity of the fund
itself. He went on to say that as between the spouses themselves, the
former spouse could be compensated by receiving an award of more
than half of some other community asset. 191
Footnote nine in the Waite opinion enlarges on this distinction by
explaining how the trial court may, in its discretion, compute the actua-
185. Id at 472-73, 492 P.2d at 20-21, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33.
186. Id at 473, 492 P.2d at 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
187. Id at 473 n.7, 492 P.2d at 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
188. Id at 473, 492 P.2d at 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
189. Id at 474, 492 P.2d at 22, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
190. Brief for Appellant Flournoy, Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 325 (1972).
191. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d at 474, 492 P.2d at 22, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
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rial value of the benefit which cannot be paid directly from the plan., 
92
Although it has been described as an "oversight by the court,"1
93 foot-
note nine is, on the contrary, entirely consistent with the court's holding
that the wife had no interest enforceable against the plan after her
death but nonetheless had an interest which could be included as part
of the community property divisible between the spouses themselves. 194
In other words, the California Supreme Court has not permitted divi-
sions of property on divorce to be made in a manner that would frus-
trate the provisions of the retirement plan itself. Subsequent cases have
recognized this principle explicitly where direct division of the asset
cannot be ordered.
95
192. Id at 474 n.9, 492 P.2d at 22, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
193. Reppy, supra note 3, at 456. Subsequent cases have not ignored footnote 9 in
Waite, see id, but have misapplied it. See, e.g., Berry v. Board of Retirement of the County
of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. App. 3d 757, 100 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1972), where the parties stipulated
that if the husband retired and withdrew his contribution to the county retirement program,
the wife would be entitled to half of the value of his contributions at the time of divorce. If
he did not retire and withdraw his contribution, the court was to retain jurisdiction to make
a fair and equitable division of the benefit between the parties. On the death of the husband
prior to retirement, the ex-wife claimed a portion of the widow's benefit as her community
property. The court denied her claim, in effect holding she waived it when she did not take
the guaranteed sum but took her chances that the husband would live until retirement. Id
at 754, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 551. In other words, since no actuarial equivalent was determined
at the time of divorce, any interest in the total benefit, including the employee spouse's
contribution, was lost. This puts the wife betweey Scylla and Charybdis. She either must
take a guaranteed amount based solely on employee contributions at the time of divorce,
which is much less than the expected retirement benefit that would become payable if the
employee lived to retirement, or risk losing all right to the benefits. Berry is a misapplica-
tion of both Benson and Waite.
194. The Internal Revenue Service has always recognized that the nonemployee spouse
in a community property jurisdiction has an interest in post death benefits, even after
ERISA. See Rev. Rul. 67-278, 1967-2 C.B. 323, which required that the interest of a nonem-
ployee spouse in the employee's retirement plan be included in his or her gross estate if he or
she predeceased the spouse. That ruling was overridden by the enactment of I.R.C.
§ 2039(d), which excludes the nonemployee spouse's interest from his or her gross estate in
the same manner and to the same extent that I.R.C. § 2039(c) does for the employee spouse.
I.R.C. § 2039(c), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(c)(5),
90 Stat. 1896 (1976).
I.R.C. § 2517(c) extends a similar exclusion for gift tax purposes to nonemployee
spouses who designate beneficiaries under plans. When the spouses are still married at the
time of the nonemployee spouse's death, the presumption is that the deceased spouse would
want the benefit to be payable in full to the employee spouse or to their jointly designated
beneficiary and so the question of to whom the interest should be paid has not arisen. When
the spouses are divorced, however, that question must be faced. Waite would simply permit
the plan administrator to refuse to make payments to persons other than to the nonemployee
spouse. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 473, 492 P.2d 13, 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333 (1972),
disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n. 14, 544 P.2d
561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976).
195. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr.
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Thus, the terminable interest rule encompasses two distinct rights.
One is the right to have postdeath payments included as part of the
marital property which is subject to division on divorce and the other is
the right to collect the marital property interest from the plan after the
death of either spouse. If the terminable interest rule is read as a limi-
tation on the latter right, it may make some sense. In this context, the
rule would mean that the bifurcated payment of benefits will have to be
made only to the principal parties: the employee and his or her former
spouse. Questions of privity, as well as administrative costs of keeping
track of multiple postdeath beneficiaries, would be avoided. Moreover,
the congressional intention to provide for the surviving spouse, unless
the plan or the participant specifies otherwise, would not be violated.
Application of the terminable interest rule to preclude recovery
from the plan after the death of either spouse should not apply to valu-
ation of the marital property interest in the retirement benefits itself.
Valuation of that interest should turn on the account balance or the
actuarial value of the accrued benefit and not on the form in which the
benefit is to be paid out. Extension of the terminable interest rule to
deny a marital property interest in death benefits is irrational and un-
fair. The proper approach would require valuation of the total benefit
payable and selection of a mode of division of the marital property that
does not require collection of death benefits from the plan by either the
former spouse or his or her heirs. This could be accomplished by mak-
ing a lump sum distribution to the nonemployee spouse 9 6 or by paying
the nonemployee spouse an equivalent annuity computed with refer-
ence to the nonemployee spouse's life expectancy. Although the latter
method might result in the nonemployee spouse receiving a larger por-
tion of each payment than the employee does during their joint lives,
an equivalent portion of the employee spouse's benefit would be paya-
ble to his or her surviving spouse or other beneficiary.
Incidental Rights of the Nonemployee Spouse
Participants and beneficiaries have many rights under ERISA be-
590 (1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); In re Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d
1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974). In Hisquierdo, the California Supreme Court awarded
equivalent assets to a spouse who could not be awarded a share in the benefit itself. The
availability of this technique in federally funded benefits has been precluded by the
Supreme Court's reversal in Hisquierdo, but it still may be used to apportion postdeath
benefits in private plans.
196. If the benefits were currently payable the lump sum could be paid to an individual
retirement account. For a discussion of mandatory rollover IRAs, see notes 135-37 & ac-
companying text supra.
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yond the right to receive benefits. They have the right to receive infor-
mation about the plan and their benefits under it, 197 to sue for breach
of fiduciary duty, 198 to make elections about the form of benefit pay-
ments, and to designate beneficiaries. 199 Amendments to ERISA
should spell out which, if any, of these rights should be enjoyed by a
nonemployee spouse.
A primary concern in evaluating these rights is the administrative
burden that falls on the plan when asked to provide information or
otherwise respond to requests from nonemployee spouses. Employee
benefit plans often must deal with divorce lawyers seeking to subpoena
records under the plan or asking for computations which the plans are
not equipped to make.200 Lawyers naturally turn to the plan for infor-
mation when the employee spouse is uncooperative and lawyers for
both spouses may be unfamiliar with how the plans operate. A proper
balancing of the administrative burden on the plan and the interest of
the nonemployee spouse should be struck.
At the time of dissolution, a nonemployee spouse should be enti-
tled to a copy of a current summary plan description and a statement of
the employee's benefit entitlement as of the date closest to separation.
Both documents currently are required to be prepared by the plan ad-
ministrator20' and need only be duplicated for the nonemployee. From
these documents, the nonemployee spouse would have the data neces-
sary to compute his or her claimed interest under the plan and to sub-
stantiate that claim in court. Because the information would be sought
to determine the spouse's own benefit, which was jointly earned, disclo-
sure should not violate the employee's right to privacy or subject the
plan administrator to liability for providing the data.
There is no need for the plan to be further embroiled in the di-
vorce proceedings until payment from the trust is required. The
method adopted originally in California and recently by the federal
government is a good one:20 2 the plan should not be required to make
197. See note 42 & accompanying text supra.
198. See noe 43 & accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 177-82 & accompanying text supra.
200. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant Seafarer's International Union, filed by Carpenter's
Pension Trust of Southern California, Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
appealdocketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978).
201. See note 42 & accompanying text supra.
202. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5106 (West Supp. 1980). It is not clear whether this section
has been repealed or superseded by CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4363-4363.3 (West Supp. 1980).
CAL. Civ. CODE § 4363 permits joinder of the plan in the divorce, which had previously
been permitted judicially. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4363 (West Supp. 1980). See In re Marriage of
Pardee, 408 F. Supp. 666 (C.D. Cal. 1976); In re Marriage of Sommers, 53 Cal. App. 3d 509,
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payment over to the nonemployee spouse unless and until it has re-
ceived notice of his or her claim via a state court decree or a marital
property settlement. At that time, if the plan fiduciary believes that an
interest of the plan would be impaired by complying with the order, or
if it questions the validity of the order, the plan fiduciary could refuse
to comply with the order, stating its reason therefor.
The nonemployee spouse should then have the right to sue the
plan in either state or federal court203 to recover benefits so withheld.
Without that right, an interest in the benefits would be virtually mean-
ingless. Beyond that, the nonemployee spouse should have no rights to
enforce ERISA. The provisions for public and private enforcement of
ERISA 2° adequately ensure that his or her interest in overall plan ad-
ministration will be protected without the necessity of granting an in-
dependent cause of action. Satisfaction of a nonemployee spouse's
interest from the plan itself does not require that he or she be given all
the rights of a full participant; accordingly those rights should be cir-
cumscribed under the statute.
Finally, the nonemployee spouse should have a limited right of
election over the form of payment of matured benefits. If the plan pro-
vides for both a lump sum payment and an annuity for life based on
the present value of the benefit, the nonemployee spouse should be able
to choose either. In neither case would the fiduciary be required to
make payments after death. The valid concerns over administration
which prompted the California Supreme Court's decision in Waite v.
Waite2 05 would be respected by this limited form of election.
Tax Consequences of Disposition of Retirement Benefits
There are tax consequences attendant upon allocation of retire-
ment benefits in a divorce and upon distribution of benefits to either or
both spouses. Those consequences should be clear, simple, and easily
administered. At the present time, however, none of these criteria are
126 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1975). Since § 4363 directly relates to an employee benefit and also deals
with a subject covered by ERISA § 502(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1976), it probably is pre-
empted under ERISA § 51, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976). But see Carpenter's Pension Fund v.
Campa, 100 S. Ct. 696 (1980), where the United States Supreme Court dismissed for want of
a substantial federal question a case in which the retirement plan was joined under § 4361.2.
203. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1976) permits concurrent state and federal jurisdiction for suits
by participants and beneficiaries.
204. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132 (1976).
205. 6 Cal. 3d 461,492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972), disapprovedon other grounds in
In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
641. See text accompanying notes 183-95 supra.
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met. The tax consequences of such distributions are complex and high-
ly speculative.
Division of Common Law Marital Property Retirement Benefits
Between the Spouses
The division of common law marital property in a divorce is a
taxable event.20 6 In common law jurisdictions, retirement benefits are
owned by the employee spouse. Although there is no authority directly
on point on the taxation of retirement benefits divided between the
spouses in a divorce, the anticipated results may be derived from the
rules developed to govern divisions of other marital property.
20 7
If retirement benefits are divided between the spouses on divorce,
the employee spouse in a noncommunity property jurisdiction may be
deemed to have exchanged that portion of the retirement benefits
awarded to the nonemployee spouse for the surrender of his or her
marital property rights.208 If so, the amount realized from this "sale"
would be considered to be the present value of the retirement benefits
so awarded, because the value of the employee spouse's marital prop-
erty rights is deemed to be equal to the value of what is transferred in
exchange for the surrender of those rights.20 9 The employee's "basis"
would be the amount of previously taxed contributions which, in the
case of a noncontributory plan, would be zero.210 The difference be-
tween the amount realized and the basis (which may very well equal
the total present value of the benefit awarded to the nonemployee
spouse) would be taxable gain.21' Because the taxpayer is transferring
a right to future income, which when distributed would be ordinary
income, 212 any gain would be taxed at ordinary income rates.
213
206. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959,
964 (1975), aff'd, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977). The result in Davis is criticized in Note,
Should Federal Income Tax Consequences of Divorce Depend on State Property Law?, 49 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1976).
207. For a greater discussion of the tax consequences of marital property divisions of
divorce, see Anglea & Chomsky, Property Divisions-Income Tax Aspects, in TAX ASPECTS
OF MARITAL DISSOLUTIONS: A BAsIC GUIDE FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS 37 (1979);
Glickfield, Rabinow & Schwartz, Federal Income Tax Consequences of Marital Property Set-
tlements, U.S. CAL. 1974 TAX INST. 307; Sander & Gutman, Divorce and Separation, [1975]
95-3d TAX MNGM'T (BNA); Comment, The Federal income Tax Consequences of Property
Settlements in Common Law States and Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act- A
Proposal, 29 M.L. REV. 73 (1977).
208. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
209. Id at 72.
210. See I.R.C. § 72(m).
211. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
212. Rev. Rul. 69-471, 1969-2 C.B. 10.
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If the employee spouse is deemed to have sold his or her retire-
ment benefits to the nonemployee spouse, the nonemployee spouse will
have a basis in those benefits equal to their present value.214 The non-
employee spouse should be entitled to amortize that basis against the
benefits as received.
This income tax result is supported by the analogous treatment of
a widow who agrees to surrender her rights under community property
law to one half of the community property in exchange for a life estate
in the entire property, a so-called community property widow's election
will. The widow is held to have purchased a life interest in her hus-
band's share of the community and is permitted to amortize the
purchase price against the income received. 215 The transfer of her mar-
ital rights is not a taxable event as to her.
216
The results outlined above may roughly approximate the tax result
that would obtain if the entire retirement benefit had been awarded to
the employee spouse, who then was taxed on each payment as re-
ceived.217 Nonetheless, the result is extremely harsh when the division
results from a divorce. In this instance, the tax is computed on the
entire taxable portion of the retirement benefit in one year, rather than
as paid out over the distribution period. Because of the progressive rate
structure, this results in a greater tax being paid on the same taxable
income.218 Moreover, the employee is not able to use the special tax on
lump sum distributions21 9 because there has been no distribution. In
fact, even if there were a constructive distribution, the result would be
the same because it would not be of the entire balance in the account
and there would be no separation from service by the employee.220 Fi-
nally, the tax must be paid at a time when no cash has been generated
by the sale.
If the employee spouse is not taxed at the time a marital property
interest is awarded to the nonemployee spouse, the same tax treatment
would be afforded the payment of the benefits to the nonemployee
213. The transferor spouse should be able to use income averaging under LR.C.
§§ 1301-1305, provided that the other requirements of those sections are met.
214. Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (1947).
215. Gist v. United States, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970); Estate of Daisy F. Christ v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 493 (1970), a 'don other grounds, 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973).
216. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63. See Mullock, Divorce and Taxes: Rev. Rul. 67-
221, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 736 (1969).
217. See I.R.C. § 72(m).
218. 1.R.C. § 1.
219. I.R.C. § 402(e).
220. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(A).
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spouse. Consequently, the employee will be taxed in full on both his or
her share of the benefit and the share transferred to the nonemployee
spouse. Moreover, nothing would be deductible because the payments
to the nonemployee spouse would not be alimony, but installment pay-
ments of marital property.221 Of course, if the employee were taxed on
the spouse's share of the benefit at the time of divorce, there would be
no tax as a result of the distribution.
222
Division of Community Property Interests in Retirement Benefits
As discussed previously, the preferred method of disposing of re-
tirement benefits which are community property is to award them en-
tirely to the employee spouse and to allocate to the nonemployee
spouse other community assets of equal value.223 Alternatively, each
spouse may be awarded a portion of each payment when it is distrib-
uted from the plan. In either event, if the community property is di-
vided equally with reference to its fair market value, the division will
be nontaxable. 224 Other tax problems arise, however, when that benefit
is community property.
Assignment of Income
A basic principle of tax law is that earned income is taxed to the
person who earned it even when it has been validly assigned under
state law.225 The doctrine of anticipatory assignment of income may be
applied to an otherwise tax-free division of community property. 226 If
an anticipatory assignment of income has occurred, the assignor will be
taxed when payment is made to the assignee.
227
If community property is divided by awarding all retirement bene-
fits to the employee spouse, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that
the nonemployee spouse may be deemed to have made an anticipatory
221. I.R.C. § 7 1(b); Rev. Rul. 69-471, 1969-2 C.B. 10.
222. These results probably also would apply to divisions of quasi-community property,
although the tax attributes of such property have never been determined. See Anglea &
Chomsky, Property Divisions-Income Tax 4spects, in TAX ASPECTS OF MARITAL DISSOLU-
TIONS: A BASIC GUIDE FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS 60-63 (1979). In addition, the results
might apply to unequal divisions of community property, where one spouse is deemed to
have sold his or her interest. See Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), a f'd, 552
F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
223. See note 10 & accompanying text supra.
224. See Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), aft'd, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977).
225. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
226. See Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
227. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 125 (1940).
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assignment of income.228 Because retirement benefits are attributable
to services rendered during marriage, they represent earned income
which is owned equally by both spouses.229 Amounts contributed to a
qualified trust or custodian account may not have been taxed previ-
ously to the employee.230 Therefore, when the entire benefit is awarded
to the employee spouse upon dissolution, the nonemployee spouse may
continue to be liable for the tax on his or her community property por-
tion of the benefit as an anticipatory assignment of income. In that
case, the taxable portion of the nonemployee spouse's interest in each
benefit payment will be taxed to the nonemployee spouse at the time it
is paid to the employee spouse. Such payments may occur long after
the dissolution and may extend over many years, thereby requiring
continued contact between the former spouses to apportion the tax lia-
bility relating to the benefit payments.
The fact that division of the community property is not a taxable
event does not preclude application of the doctrine of assignment of
income. In Johnson v. United States,231 accounts receivable from the
husband's law practice were assigned to him under a marital property
agreement entered into prior to divorce. He claimed one half was taxa-
ble to his former spouse, even though the accounts were collected by
the husband. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding that
half of the accounts receivable, when collected, were not taxable to him
but to the former wife, who had not been taxed on the community in-
come prior to its award to the taxpayer.
232
Despite the widespread application of the doctrine of anticipatory
assignment, the relevance of Johnson and the line of cases following
it233 to an award of retirement benefits caused by marital dissolution is
unclear. These decisions, it is submitted, should not apply to a disposi-
tion of interests in retirement plans. When the property divided is
228. Private Letter Ruling 7952045 (Sept. 25, 1979). A private letter ruling may not be
used or cited as precedent, I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3), but is ignored at one's peril.
229. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1980); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111
(1930).
230. I.R.C. §§ 219, 220, 404.
231. 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
232. Id at 130.
233. Cases following Johnson are Crosby v. Commissioner, 32 A.F.T.R. 1641 (9th Cir.
1943), vacating 46 B.T.A. 323 (1942) (salary for services rendered prior to a property settle-
ment but paid after the settlement is taxable one half to each spouse); Hubner v. Commis-
sioner, 28 T.C. 1150 (1957) (ex-spouse taxed on additional, distributable net income of
husband's partnership in the year prior to the settlement agreement despite property settle-
ment reserving to the wife a fixed dollar amount equal to one half of husband's capital
interest in the partnership).
ERISA
community property, there is no rationale for taxing the assignor.
There is neither a tax avoidance incentive nor any other unconsciona-
ble motive in making the assignment which requires that the income be
taxed to the assignor.2 34 In the usual assignment of income case, a high
bracket taxpayer is trying to shift income to a low bracket taxpayer,
such as a child. By contrast, in the case of retirement benefits, because
of the progressive tax rate structure, taxing the entire benefit to the re-
cipient (the putative assignee) may well result in a higher tax being
paid than if each spouse were taxed on a portion.
In addition, the Internal Revenue Code contemplates that the
community property laws will be disregarded and the entire benefit
treated as if owned by the employee spouse when taxing the ordinary
income portion of lump sum distributions.2 35 This provision should, by
analogy, be extended to the present situation. For these reasons, the
employee spouse who has been awarded the entire retirement benefit
should be taxed on it when received. As a practical matter, that is un-
doubtedly how spouses treat retirement benefits so divided.
236
Identification of the Proper Taxpayer
When community property retirement benefits have been divided
between the spouses, the plan administrator often will pay the entire
benefit to the employee spouse who in turn will pay a share to the non-
employee spouse. In some circumstances, this may be the only way in
which benefits may be distributed.2 37 In such cases, how is the benefit
to be taxed as between the spouses? Because the employee spouse is
acting merely as a conduit for the funds, the correct approach would be
to treat the employee as a nominee or agent of the nonemployee
spouse.238 Under this analysis, the employee would not be taxed on the
234. See Hempt Bros. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826
(1974) (the assignment of income doctrine is not applied when a partnership assigned ac-
counts receivable to corporation in exchange for stock as part of tax-free incorporation of
the partnership).
235. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(G).
236. The employee spouse to whom the interest has been awarded could assume liability
for all taxes payable on the nonemployee spouse's share. This could create further tax
problems. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). For further
discussion of this issue, see Anglea & Chomsky, Property Divisions-Income Tax Asfpects, in
TAX ASPECTS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTIONS: A BASIC GUIDE FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS
37 (1979).
237. See, e.g., Inre Marriage of Fithian, 10Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1974).
238. See Rev. Rul. 58-220, 1958-1 C.B. 26. The employee spouse should attach a sched-
ule to his or her income tax returns showing the receipt of benefits, the amount paid to the
former spouse, and, if there has been tax withheld by the payor, how it is to be divided
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portion of the benefits remitted to the nonemployee spouse, but the lat-
ter would be required to include such benefits in gross income.
If the employee spouse fails to pay over the amounts after a court
order or settlement requiring payment, he or she has in effect converted
them and should be taxed on the amounts so converted.239 If subse-
quently the payments are made to the nonemployee spouse, he or she
should be entitled to a corresponding deduction in the year of pay-
ment.240 The nonemployee spouse should not be taxed on such
amounts unless and until they are in fact paid over.24'
Taxation of the Nonemployee Spouse on Distributions of the Community
Property Interest
A detailed discussion of the taxation of distributions from quali-
fied retirement plans is beyond the scope of this Article.242 In general,
however, the taxation of retirement benefits distributed to a participant
or beneficiary is quite favorable. Benefits will not be taxed until they
actually are distributed, even though fully vested.2 43 If the distribution
between the spouses. The plan apparently is required to report the benefits as if paid to the
employee spouse. Private Letter Ruling 7952045 (Sept. 25, 1979).
239. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
240. Id at 220.
241. Cf. Alsop v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1961) (agent failed to report or
deliver royalties to taxpayer).
242. For a discussion of taxation of distributions, see M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIRE-
MENT PLANS (1977); see also Lamon & Lee, Pre-Retirement Qua/fled Plan Pay-outs under
ERISA, 9 CuM. L. Rav. 83 (1978).
243. I.R.C. § 402(a). I.R.C. § 72(m) provides that if the benefit is funded only by em-
ployer contributions or contributions which were deductible when made, under I.R.C.
§§ 219, 220 & 404 the full amount of each payment will be taxable to the employee when
received. If both employee and employer contributions have been made, then the taxable
portion of the retirement benefits will be the amount in excess of contributions made by the
employee. Usually, the taxable portion of each benefit payment will be determined under
the exclusion ratio method of I.R.C. § 72(b) whereby the expected return of the benefit,
computed actuarially, is compared to the employee contributions. The ratio thus derived is
applied to each payment to determine the nontaxable or excluded portion which represents a
return of the employee's contributions.
For example, a male age 65, who has contributed $9,000 of after-tax dollars to the trust,
retires and is entitled to receive $200 a month for life. His retirement benefit or "expected
return" is $2,400 per year X 15.0 years (his life expectancy under Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 Table
A (1957)) or $36,000. His contribution or "investment in the contract" is $9,000. I.R.C.
... $9,000
§ 72(c)(I) & (f). The exclusion ratio will be '0 or .25. Therefore, $600 of his $2,400
$36,000
pension each year (.25 X $2,400) will not be taxable to him.
If the same employee had contributed only $6,000, he would be taxed under the "three
year recovery method." I.R.C. § 72(d)(1). Under this method, if the aggregate amount re-
ceivable as benefits in the first three years equals or exceeds the employee's contributions,
then the benefit payments will first be treated as a return of contributions. In our example,
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qualifies as a lump sum distribution,244 it will be subject to a "separate
tax" resulting in the application of even more favorable tax rates.
245
Taxation of a lump sum may be deferred by either the employee or the
surviving spouse2 4 6 by rolling it over in whole or in part into an IRA or
into another qualified plan.247 Moreover, amounts attributable to em-
ployer contributions will be excluded from the gross estate of the em-
ployee if they are paid on account of his or her death to a distributee
other than the employee's estate or executor.2 48 A nonemployee spouse
who predeceases the employee is entitled to a comparable exclusion
from his or her gross estate of the community property interest.
2 49
Which, if any, of these rules should be applicable to the nonem-
ployee spouse whose community property interest in the benefits is sev-
ered upon divorce? The nonemployee spouse should not be taxed on
an interest until it is distributed from the plan.2 50 If the interest is dis-
tributed in one payment, the payment would probably not qualify for
lump sum treatment under the conditions specified in Internal Revenue
Code section 402(e)(4)2 51 and probably would not be the "balance to
the credit" of the employee but only his or her community property
portion thereof
2 52
If a lump sum distribution is made at the same time a distribution
is made to the employee, then the nonemployee spouse should be enti-
tled to have the pre-1974 portion of the distribution taxed at favorable
nothing would be taxed in the first two years, and in the third year $1,200 ($6,000 in total
employee contributions less the $4,800 received in years one and two) would not be taxable.
Thereafter, the full amount of each payment would be taxable.
244. A lump sum distribution is one payable to the distributee in one taxable year on
account of death, disability, separation from service, or after attainment of age 59 . I.R.C.
§ 402(e)(4).
245. The lump sum distribution will be divided into two parts. The taxable portion, i.e.,
the excess over employee contributions, attributable to participation in the plan prior to
January 1, 1974 will receive long term capital gain treatment. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2). The taxa-
ble portion attributable to post-1973 participation will be subject to a "separate tax" under
which the distribution is taxed as if it were the only income received by the taxpayer, aver-
aged over a ten year period. I.R.C. § 402(e).
246. I.R.C. § 402(a)(7), added by Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 157(g), 92
Stat. 2806-2807 (1978).
247. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5), (6)(C) & (D). The rules regarding rollovers are technical and
complex. For a description of such rollovers, see IRS, PUBLICATION 590, TAX INFORMATION
ON INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT SAVINGS PROGRAMS (1979).
248. I.R.C. § 2039(c).
249. I.R.C. § 2039(d).
250. The nonemployee spouse also should not be taxed if the benefit is put into an Indi-
vidual Retirement Account. See notes 135-37 & accompanying text supra.
251. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4).
252. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(A).
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capital gains rates under section 402(a)(2). 253 The nonemployee spouse
could not, however, use the "separate tax" provided by that section on
the ordinary income portion of the distribution. The statute does not
permit married spouses in community property states to use the sepa-
rate tax on each spouse's one half of the post-1973 lump sum distribu-
tion.254 A similar result should obtain if the marriage is dissolved prior
to distribution, so that the nonemployee spouse would be taxed at ordi-
nary income rates on the post-1973 lump sum distribution.
A nonemployee spouse probably would not be eligible to roll over
a lump sum distribution if it is made after divorce; after that time he or
she is not the surviving spouse.255 Therefore, the nonemployee spouse
would not qualify under Internal Revenue Code sections 402(a)(5) and
402(a)(7) for a tax-deferred rollover. If a qualified lump sum distribu-
tion is made to the employee prior to the divorce, the employee may
take advantage of the rollover rules to put the benefits into an IRA.
256
The IRA then may be divided between the spouses tax free.257 The
.separate tax will not be available for later distributions from the IRA
for either spouse, even if the distribution is in the form of a lump
sum.
2 5 8
Legislative Proposals for Taxing Retirement Benefits on Divorce
Disposition of retirement benefits upon divorce requires tax cer-
tainty. Property settlement agreements involving retirement benefits
are entered into in part with the expectation that certain tax results will
follow. The present state of the law, however, is intolerably uncertain.
The tax results surrounding disposition of retirement benefits are at
best speculative and, at worst, to the extent they can be deduced, harsh
and unfair. In noncommunity property jurisdictions, the prospect of a
division of benefits upon divorce being treated as a taxable sale pro-
duces results which are unduly harsh to the employee spouse, who will
be taxed on the full benefit, and unduly lenient to the nonemployee
spouse, who may not be taxed at all. In community property states, the
potential assignment of income issue is a troublesome problem. In ei-
ther case, the different tax consequences that flow from the receipt of
253. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2). See H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 152 n.5, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4817.
254. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(G).
255. See text accompanying notes 159-62 supra.
256. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5).
257. I.R.C. § 408(d)(5).
258. I.R.C. § 408(d).
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benefits as a divorced spouse rather than as a surviving spouse seem
unwarranted.
Once again, ERISA contains the model which can be adapted to
solve these problems. The present nontaxable transfer of an IRA on
divorce should be extended to cover the transfer of all retirement bene-
fits upon divorce. Correspondingly, each spouse should be treated as
having made one half of the employee contributions, if any, to the
plan 259 and should be taxed individually on the benefits when distrib-
uted under Internal Revenue Code sections 72 and 402. If benefits are
awarded entirely to one spouse, assignment of income doctrines should
not apply.
Of course, every tax statute must have an exception; here, neither
spouse should be able to take advantage of the separate tax on lump
sum distributions individually.260 Congress has specified that the tax
was to be computed in disregard of community property laws for good
reason. There is already a significant tax advantage in using the sepa-
rate tax on the taxable portion of the lump sum distribution by one
spouse. That advantage would be increased unconscionably if each
spouse were to use the special tax on one half of the distribution, as-
suming it met the other requirements. Therefore, if the spouses are
going to avail themselves of the separate tax, it should be computed
with regard to the entire lump sum distribution and each spouse should
be individually liable for the tax on his or her respective share.
In addition, each spouse should be able to roll over that portion of
the retirement benefit distributed in the form of a single payment. If
the distribution is made to the nonemployee spouse while the employee
is still employed, a rollover should be mandatory.26' If a single pay-
ment is made to either spouse when benefits have become payable
under the plan, a rollover should be elective as to each spouse individu-
ally.262 A former spouse need not be treated differently from a surviv-
ing spouse in this respect.
Conclusion
Accommodation of the nonemployee spouse's community prop-
erty interest in retirement benefits should not be difficult. The majority
259. This would correspond to retention of the marital basis by the spouse awarded the
asset in property divided tax free in a divorce. See Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 1213.
260. See note 236 supra.
261. See notes 135-37 & accompanying text supra.
262. This could be accomplished by amending I.R.C. § 402(a)(7) to include former
spouses.
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of the complexities and costs generated by the issue have arisen solely
because the law is unsettled. Once a former spouse's interest in a plan
arising out of the marital relationship is clarified, attention may be fo-
cused on accommodating that interest in the simplest and fairest way
possible. Filing the state court decree with the plan as a condition of
payment, authorization of the plan fiduciary to distribute the interest to
the nonemployee spouse independently of 'distribution to the employee
spouse, and use of mandatory individual retirement accounts would
preserve the retirement goals of ERISA as to the nonemployee spouse's
benefit, at little or no additional cost to the plan. Tax-free division of
retirement benefits on divorce, with the nonemployee spouse taxed in
the same manner as the employee, also should be provided for. In this
way, disposition of retirement benefits on divorce can be treated in an
ordinary, routine manner instead of as the troublesome and often insol-
uble problem it is today.

